1.18 Soul

Section 18 (first updated 12.24.2020)

(see mind body unity/dualism)

Aristotle and the Soul as Active Agency of the Mind

1:20 — Aristotle aims to demonstrate that the soul is the active agency of the mind. He defines the soul as the principle of natural life, the underlying actuality that animates living bodies¹. Aristotle emphasizes the difficulty of this inquiry, noting that “to attain sure knowledge about what the soul is, [is] one of the most difficult things in the world“².

3:20 — Concerning the question of what the soul is, Aristotle notes that discussions often restrict the term “soul” to the human soul, which conflates two distinct issues: (1) whether the soul can be defined by a single ambiguous formula, or (2) whether there must be distinct formulas for different kinds of living beings (e.g., dog, horse, human).

Aristotle poses a simple yet profound question: Is the soul of a dog the same as the soul of a human? His answer is nuanced—both possess a soul, and thus share in the same fundamental substance. However, the nature of a dog is vastly different from that of a human. Consequently, the way each being perceives, behaves, and exists expresses distinct capacities of the same essential principle.

The soul, as a philosophical principle, does not differ in substance per se—just as all physical objects share material substance, so do all living beings share soul-substance. What distinguishes them is the degree of complexity their souls exhibit³. This stratification corresponds with Aristotle’s doctrine of the hierarchy of soul functions—from the vegetative (plants), to the sensitive (animals), to the rational (humans)⁴.

From this perspective, the evolutionary notion of development begins to supplement Aristotle’s philosophical notion. Evolution does not merely contradict metaphysics—it reintroduces it in a new form: as the principle of inner development or unfolding of a universal substance through differentiated forms.

This leads to the deeper ontological point: any monism—i.e., any claim of fundamental unity—contains within itself a duality. Substance is not merely one thing; it is a relation between Being and Nothing. That is, within the unity of any substance, there lies a tension or dialectic between its pure existence (Being) and its lack of determinacy (Nothing)⁵.

Thus, when something is “itself,” it is also the “other” of itself—it includes within itself its own opposition. This dialectical principle, especially prominent in Hegelian metaphysics, underlines that identity includes difference, and true selfhood is always a self-relation that encompasses change and contradiction⁶.

Footnotes

Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §18–19. Hegel argues that the essence of reality is self-mediation—identity through contradiction, or “being-within-itself” that necessarily unfolds as otherness. ↩

Aristotle, De Anima (On the Soul), Book II. Aristotle defines the soul as the form of a natural body that has life potentially; it is what makes a body a living thing rather than a corpse. ↩

Ibid., Book I, 402a10. ↩

This parallels Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory: everything is a compound of form (morphe) and matter (hyle). The soul is the form of a living body—what organizes the material into a coherent, living whole. ↩

Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of soul: the nutritive soul (plants), the sensitive soul (animals), and the rational soul (humans). See De Anima, Book II. ↩

This idea is closely echoed in Hegel’s Logic, where the beginning of all being is the unity of Being and Nothing, and their resolution is Becoming—a relation that gives rise to determinate existence. See: G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic. ↩

The Ancient Paradox of Part and Whole

1. Zeno’s Paradox of Parts and Wholes

One of the earliest formulations of the paradox of parts and wholes comes from Zeno of Elea, a Greek philosopher who sought to challenge common understandings of plurality and motion. Zeno’s Paradox of Parts and Wholes confronts the contradiction inherent in dividing concrete objects:

• If an object is divided, its parts must be both discrete and part of the same whole. But if each part is discrete, they can’t aggregate meaningfully into a coherent object; if they must combine into a coherent whole, they’re no longer fully discrete.
• Zeno points out that assuming an object is composed of distinguishable parts leads to absurd results: either everything becomes infinitely small (because you must divide further), or infinitely large (because dividing requires more parts between parts), or motion and identity become logically incoherent.
  Source: Zeno’s Paradox of Parts and Wholes is discussed in Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption (316a15–34) and further analyzed in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Plato Project).

2. Plato’s Third Man Argument

In the dialogue Parmenides, Plato introduces the Third Man Argument—a critique of the Theory of Forms that highlights the infinite regress one faces when identifying shared forms:

• If a man is a man because he participates in the Form of Man, then both the man and the Form require a third Form—a “Third Man”—to explain how they are both man.
• This leads to an infinite regress, undermining the ability to unify the many under a single Form.

The Third Man paradox ironically contains its own resolution within its proposition. The issue arises from the separation between form and object — the idea that the object takes on a form. But what allows this process to happen? If it is form that allows it, then another form is required to mediate between the object and the initial form. This relation itself becomes a third form.

Once a third form is introduced into this relation, it opens the way for an infinite regress: each proposed object would require an external cause, and that cause would in turn require yet another, and so on.

However, the resolution is relatively simple. The Third Man is not differentiated merely in quantity, because that would be contradictory and lead to infinite regress. Instead, the distinction is in type or quality. In this sense, the third element plays a final and essential role — a role Plato himself gestures toward in his later attempts to resolve the issue.

The third element serves as a conceptual unity in which form and matter combine to constitute the object as perceived in sensation. They are dynamically interconnected in order to explain the phenomenon. The phenomenon is already unified as form, object, and the third — an observer — who constitutes the whole of the situation. This unity is later broken down into its particular parts and explained as separate components.

3. Mereological Principles in Medieval Thought

During the medieval period, thinkers like Boethius and Peter Abelard examined mereological—part-whole—relations in detail:

• Boethius, in De Divisione, addresses questions like: if the whole exists, must all its parts exist? And if a part doesn’t exist, can the whole still exist?
• Abelard critiques simplistic notions of identity over change, such as the extreme view that any change in parts would destroy the identity of the whole—e.g., Socrates would cease to exist if he lost a hand.

These reflections laid groundwork for later metaphysical treatments of matter, form, and persistence.

Source: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, entry on medieval mereology.

All of these philosophical conversations about part and whole resonate with: matter is not an object in itself but the relational substrate of potential forms.

• Zeno’s paradox shows that viewing material objects as aggregates of discrete parts fails because infinite division undermines unity.
• Plato’s Third Man Argument demonstrates that abstract unification (the Form) also fails to ground identity without an infinite regress.
• Medieval mereology enhances this by revealing that identity of a whole doesn’t reduce simply to the sum of parts—they hold an essential relation that preserves form across change.

The form, rather than matter-as-stuff, is what gives identity and coherence—: neither pure multiplicity (plurality of parts) nor abstract universals alone can account for coherent reality without invoking the relational structure intrinsic to form.

Summary Table

Paradox / Theory	Problem Explored	Implication
Zeno of Elea – Paradox of Parts and Wholes	The incoherence of infinite division of parts	Material wholeness cannot be taken as mere sum of parts
Plato – Third Man Argument	The regress of Forms when explaining unity	Abstract identity requires relational grounding
Medieval Mereology – Boethius & Abelard	Identity over part-change; limits of division	Wholeness involves form-based continuity, not component stability

The Third Man Argument (TMA) says:

If a man is a man because he participates in the Form of Man, then both the individual and the Form are “man.” So we must posit a third Form to explain their shared man-ness… and so on ad infinitum.
Thus, Forms fail to explain unity—they generate infinite divisions, rather than resolve them.

So, how do we resolve this?

1. Plato’s Own (Implied) Solution: Non-Participation by Forms

In Parmenides, Plato presents the TMA but does not refute it directly. However, in later dialogues (like the Sophistand Timaeus), he modifies his theory, suggesting:

• Forms do not participate in other Forms the same way particulars do.
• The Form of Man does not need another Form to be what it is—it is self-predicating or essential.
• Forms may contain themselves, or have their own kind of unity that doesn’t require further abstraction.

This blocks the regress by changing the participation relation:

• Particulars participate in Forms, but Forms are what they are essentially, not by participating in other Forms.

Problem: This borders on circularity or makes Forms self-contained metaphysical entities, which still feels problematic to many philosophers.

2. Aristotle’s Resolution: Form Is Immanent, Not Transcendent

Aristotle—Plato’s student—offers a direct rejection and replacement of the Theory of Forms.

He says:

❝ The form is not a separate thing existing in a separate world. It is in the thing itself as its essence. ❞
(Metaphysics Z, H, Θ)

• Forms are not separate realities. They exist in things (this is called hylomorphism—matter + form).
• A man is a man because of the form (soul) within him, not because he partakes in an otherworldly Form. The Form and the man are the same.
• Therefore, no third man is needed: The unity of man is in the actual substance, not in abstract participation.

This eliminates the infinite regress, since the form is not external to the thing.

Metaphysics Book Z and H is where Aristotle outlines this.

3. Neoplatonic Resolution: Hierarchical Emanation

Neoplatonists like Plotinus (3rd century CE) reinterpret Plato’s Forms in a non-literal and metaphysical way.

• All reality emanates from the One (the Good).
• Forms are ontological levels, not separate “objects.”
• The Form of Man is not a thing that stands next to men—it’s an intelligible structure emanating from a higher unity.

Because all multiplicity is grounded in an original unity, the regress does not arise. There is no infinite chain of Forms because all are reflections of the One.

The TMA is avoided because identity is explained through causal emanation, not participation.

4. Modern Idealist Resolution: Hegelian Dialectic

Hegel reinterprets the Form–particular distinction through the lens of dialectical development:

❝ The universal does not exist beside the particular, but unfolds through it. The universal is immanent in the particular and realizes itself in and through finite forms. ❞

Hegel’s Key Resolution:

• The universal (Form) is not static, but dynamic—it is the process of self-unfolding.
• There’s no need for a Third Man, because the unity between particular and universal is resolved through mediation.
• Each “new” Form that appears is not separate, but a necessary stage in the self-realization of the Concept (Begriff).

So, rather than an infinite regress, there’s an infinite progress, where each apparent contradiction (e.g., man–Form)is sublated (Aufhebung) into a higher unity.

This retains Plato’s metaphysical depth but resolves the paradox via dialectical logic.

5. Contemporary Logical Resolution: Restrict the Predicate

Modern analytic philosophers resolve TMA by restricting the predication of the Form. For example:

• The Form of Man does not itself need to be a man, just like the Form of Large need not be large.
• This avoids self-predication, and the regress never begins.

However, this changes Plato’s metaphysical assumptions, and critics argue it loses the richness of the original theory.

Summary Table: Resolutions to the Third Man Argument

View	Key Resolution	Does It Work?
Plato (late dialogues)	Forms are self-predicating or non-participating	Partial resolution
Aristotle	Forms exist in things, not separate	Clear resolution
Neoplatonism	Forms emanate from a higher unity	Metaphysical depth
Hegel	Universal develops through particulars	Dialectical resolution
Modern Logic	Forms aren’t self-predicating	Technically neat but changes Plato’s intent

Footnotes

• Plato, Parmenides 132a–b
• Aristotle, Metaphysics Book Z, H, and Θ
• Plotinus, Enneads V.1, VI.4
• Hegel, Science of Logic and Phenomenology of Spirit

The Soul: Whole, Parts, and the Primacy of Substance

Aristotle poses a profound question in De Anima:

“If what exists is not a plurality of souls, but a plurality of parts of one soul, which ought we to investigate first—the whole or its parts?”
— De Anima I.4 (403a), as cited in Aristotle’s foundational inquiry into the nature of the soul (faculty.georgetown.edu).

This inquiry raises several key philosophical issues:

1. Priority of Investigation
   Should we begin with a part, and if so, which one? Can any part properly indicate the nature of the whole? Or should we start with the whole soul, defined by the interrelation of its parts?
2. Unity Amidst Plurality
   If the whole is defined by the relations between distinct parts, why—and how—does the whole maintain unity? Conversely, how do parts remain individuated if all contribute to the whole?
3. Cognitive Limits of Understanding
   These questions challenge our cognitive frameworks—our capacity to understand wholes through their parts is inherently constrained by our intellectual limits.

Aristotle’s Resolution: Teleology and Structural Hierarchy

Aristotle offers a sophisticated response that avoids privileging either the parts or the whole in isolation. In essence, what he proposes:

• The whole soul is a unified, hierarchical structure, not merely the sum of disconnected parts.
• It consists of an ordered series of capacities—nutritive, perceptive, and intellective—each building upon and containing the others potentially, while serving a distinct function (Brill).
• The lower capacities (e.g., nourishment) are not just components—they exist for the sake of higher capacities (e.g., perception), exhibiting teleological subordination: the lower enables the higher.

Thus, the whole soul is prior in being, whereas the parts enjoy priority in definition and explanatory power. We start with understanding what constitutes the whole’s nature, and then analyze how each part functions and contributes to that nature.

Substance & Organic Unity

Aristotle conceives of the soul as the substance’s form, imbuing matter with life and unity. He explains:

• When an organism is divided—for example, a plant cut into two—it is observed that each segment retains vital powers (e.g., nutrition and sensation), albeit temporarily (faculty.georgetown.edu, classics.mit.edu).
• From this, he infers that the soul—though capable of being described by its parts—is indivisible in its substance: every part of the body contains the whole soul in its essence, though not in its full capacity (New Advent, Wikipedia).
• This foundational understanding is rooted in his hylomorphic framework: form (the soul) and matter (the body) constitute one substance, inseparable and functionally integrated (Wikipedia).

Summary: Wholeness Without Reductionism

Question	Aristotle’s Answer
Should we begin with part or whole?	Begin with the whole for ontological primacy; parts hold explanatory priority.
How does the soul remain unified?	It is a unified structure of ordered, interdependent capacities.
Can parts indicate the whole?	Yes—as potential aspects of the unified essence.
Does division destroy the soul?	No; division affects functioning but not the substance.

Footnotes

• Aristotle’s central enigma on the priorities of investigation: De Anima I.4, 403a (faculty.georgetown.edu).
• His account of the soul’s hierarchical structure and teleology: Brill commentary on Aristotle (Brill).
• Observations on soul’s unity in divided organisms: De Anima II, and classical commentaries (faculty.georgetown.edu, classics.mit.edu).
• On the soul as substantial form and its indissoluble presence: Aquinas’ Summa and popular interpretation (New Advent, Wikipedia).
• The hylomorphic principle: union of matter and form as essential to living being (Wikipedia).

Plurality

If the soul is “plurality” only as parts of one soul, which magnitude should we investigate first—the whole or the parts? The “part” or “whole” are categories described as magnitudes of the soul. The soul takes on inverse magnitudes of substance. If we choose some “part” first, do we begin from an arbitrary part, or is the start of “part” the specific indication of the whole? If the whole is the relation between all distinct parts, why does it describe the same nature as the part that is distinct from any other part? If the whole is the same, why does it differentiate parts? If the latter, we must ascertain what element of the part enables indication of the whole. These questions are “formulated” by the understanding’s limit of apprehension.

The properties point to the essential nature. The mind formulates possibilities of existence into the same relation, undergoing through them spatially as their extended duration throughout time. In other words, space is itself formulated by the mind as a quality within time—say, an event, or object(s) within events. The soul is the “maintained” unity that carries out an extended self-identity throughout the duration of changing events in time.

Is “substance” understandable only as a complex of body and soul, or is there soul by itself without body? For example, when we die, we assume the soul leaves the body, as if the soul becomes its own separate object and becomes separated from the object it left behind—the body. But this explanation is illogical because the soul becomes reducible to the same substance as the body. The soul becomes material if it becomes a separate object. The question, however, remains unexplained: how is the soul a different substance than body—not how soul and body are separated, different objects?

Thought seems to be the closest substance to describing soul as an independent substance from body, but this is only understood by the fact that abstract thought is a process involving the theoretical change of bodies, and in that way operates more fundamentally than an already formulated body brought about by that change. When German Idealists say “pure thought”, they are NOT talking about a purely theoretical place where thought considers possibilities without those possibilities having concrete reality. Instead, “pure” thought describes the most fundamental and basic substance in the universe—the “purest” substance, unmixed, unlike how chemical compounds mix together to form biological organisms¹.

Thought is the substance that determines time as a quality of moments into direct experience. The “observer” encompasses this process of reality.

The pre-distinction of everything as qualities is thought maintaining the same substance as distinct qualities of experience. Pure thought is an actual substance in the world, disclosing a set of possibilities that ascertain moments in time and share the same potentiality of becoming concrete reality. Thought is the equal determination of selecting one moment to occupy the present over another in a long linear duration—extension of time into an indeterminate, infinite singularity point of space².

But these are instances of fundamental abstractions whose truths are derived from the examination of any body. It still remains unclear whether there are bodies approximate in foundation to abstract concepts like circular, straight, etc. Especially if we take into account the universal fact that every movement involves body. Is there a body that is purely circular? Even such important questions assume that at the level beyond perception, activities exhibit static abstract forms³.

Footnotes:

Aristotle raises related questions in Physics (Book IV) regarding the distinction between form and matter, particularly in discussions of motion and the continuity of space. ↩

See Hegel’s Science of Logic for a comprehensive development of “pure being” and “pure thought” as identical, foundational to all determinations. Cf. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, A19/B33, for a distinction between sensibility and understanding. ↩ ↩²

Compare with Bergson’s Time and Free Will for the notion of pure duration (la durée) as distinct from spatialized time. ↩

Here’s a deeper analysis and expansion of your thoughtful reflections on thought, substance, mind, and form, enriched with structured clarity and Hegelian philosophical sources:

Thought as the Primary Substance

You propose that thought may be the closest expression of the soul as an independent substance, distinguished from body. This view resonates powerfully with German Idealism, particularly Hegel’s philosophy.

Indeed, pure thought in Hegel is not abstract fantasy or detached speculation. Instead, it represents the most fundamental substance of reality—a perfectly unalloyed mode of being, unlike compound entities like chemical substances or biological organisms. In Hegel’s Science of Logic, he asserts that:

“This objective thinking… is its content alone which has absolute truth… it is the veritable matter—but a matter which is not external to the form, since this matter is rather pure thought and hence the absolute form itself.” (marxists.org)

Thus, logic is the realm of pure thought where the distinction between subject and object dissolves, and pure self-consciousness becomes the very structure of truth.

The Observer and Temporal Form

You insightfully observe that thought shapes our experience of time as a structured sequence of moments—selecting one moment over another, forming an ongoing present in the mind. This aligns with Hegel’s view that reality unfolds through dialectical progression—contrasts, negations, and syntheses forming the movement of the Idea through time.

Abstract Forms and the Physical Body

You ask whether any physical body might approximate ideal forms like “purely circular” or “straight.” Aristotle tackled similar issues, distinguishing between the simplicity of motion and the composite nature of physical bodies:

“All motion… is either straight or circular… these two are the only simple movements…” (Internet Sacred Text Archive)

Here, the circle emerges as the perfect form, yet Aristotle concludes that no earthly body is purely circular—such perfection remains unattainable in the realm of matter.

Integrating Hegelian Thought

Your reflections parallel Hegel’s idea that thought is self-determining, self-identical, and the absolute ground of all being. In Hegel’s system:

• Being and nothingness are not separate; they are interwoven in the dialectical movement of pure thought(marxists.org).
• The “Absolute Idea” represents the unity of thought and being, a total self-awareness that unfolds through forms and categories in nature and spirit(marxists.org).
• Thought fulfills its own reality—it is both substance and form, the living content of the universe.

Summary Table

Concept	Expanded Insight
Thought as Substance	Hegel elevates pure thought to the prime mover of reality—abstract yet real.
Temporal Structuring	Thought orders time by distinguishing and selecting moments, forming continuity.
Abstract Forms vs Bodies	Echoing Aristotle, no physical body achieves the ideal form, though thought conceives it.
Dialectical Reality	Being is inseparable from thought; contradictions propel development.
Absolute Idea	Ultimate unity of thought and reality, where logic, nature, and spirit interpenetrate.

Visual Analogy

Imagine pure thought as the light of the mind illuminating the world. Physical bodies and events pass through this light, becoming visible, structured, and coherent. Yet the light itself—unchanged and ever-present—is the fundamental substance, ordering all experience without merging with it.

Aristotle outlines how the differing viewpoints about the same object characterize the conception of it in different light. When we say that the object involves different viewpoints that explain its nature, we do not mean that all viewpoints are equally fundamentally the same in describing the object.

Aristotle elucidates (De Anima, Book 1, Part 1):

“Hence a physicist would define an affection of soul differently from a dialectician; the latter would define e.g. anger as the appetite for returning pain for pain, or something like that, while the former would define it as a boiling of the blood or warm substance surrounding the heart. The latter assigns the material conditions, the former the form or formulable essence; for what he states is the formulable essence of the fact, though for its actual existence there must be embodiment of it in a material such as is described by the other. Thus the essence of a house is assigned in such a formula as ‘a shelter against destruction by wind, rain, and heat’; the physicist would describe it as ‘stones, bricks, and timbers’; but there is a third possible description which would say that it was that form in that material with that purpose or end. Which, then, among these is entitled to be regarded as the genuine physicist? The one who confines himself to the material, or the one who restricts himself to the formulable essence alone? Is it not rather the one who combines both in a single formula? If this is so, how are we to characterize the other two?”¹

The above quote simply demonstrates that the physical nature of the soul determines its expression by thought. Thought determines the nature of substance that the soul assumes in its physical form, whether it be chemical reactions in the brain, thermodynamic temperature of heat—the conception of how to view it influences how the physical manifestation appears to the observer, whether that “appearance” is experienced by perception or any other sense faculty that receives information as sensations.

Aristotle outlines how each ontology about the same substance actually conceives its true nature. For example, the same emotion—let’s say anger—is the “appetite to inflict pain,” or is anger the “boiling of the blood”? Both these scenarios happen when anger occurs, but they are not the same. They describe different dimensions of the same identity. Which of these conceptions describes the phenomena more fundamentally? This is the philosophical question.

Footnotes

Aristotle, De Anima (On the Soul), Book 1, Part 1. Translation available from MIT Classics Archive and others. This section highlights Aristotle’s hylomorphic (form-matter) view of beings, suggesting that a complete explanation must combine both formal and material causes. ↩

Refer to Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 1 (Part 2)¹.

Motion in the ancient sense used to describe the generation of qualities, and not just their change in direction and location.

The two characteristic marks that have, above all others, been recognized by Plato and the pre-Socratics, is the soul involves motion, which is the ability to cause-into-being, to produce into reality.

Motion in the ancient times is understood as not just the change of location, which is the change of a position on a plane.

Motion in respect to location—locomotion—and is cognition, the abstract ability of conceiving something, or coming to know it, is the same as the thing coming into being.

Footnotes

Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I, Part 2: “All men suppose what is called Wisdom to deal with the first causes and the principles of things… And since we know a thing only when we know its first causes and its principles, clearly we must try to obtain this knowledge about the first causes.” Aristotle goes on to describe that wisdom involves knowledge of causes, and that motion—especially the type relating to coming-into-being (generation)—is crucial to understanding the soul, nature, and reality. See also the distinction Aristotle makes between types of motion (change), including generation, alteration, and locomotion in Physics, Book III. ↩

Here’s a richer elaboration of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book 1 Part 2, contextualizing its exploration of motion, soul, and substance:

1. Ancient Conceptions of Motion

In Aristotle’s framework, motion (kinesis) encompasses more than just locomotion—it broadly refers to any kind of change:

• This includes generation, alteration, and change of quality, as well as change of place. Motion is the actualization of a previously unrealized potentiality (turn0search5).
• Thus, motion is intimately tied to becoming, a foundational principle in Aristotle’s philosophy.

2. Motion as Essence of the Soul

Motion in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Book 1, Part 2): Beyond Locomotion

Both Plato and the pre-Socratics recognized the soul (psychē) as embodied motion—the power to bring into being:

• Aristotle agrees that the soul is the principle of life and motion in living bodies, not as an external force, but as an internal source of activity.
• Critically, he refines earlier views by rejecting the idea that the soul moves itself autonomously. Instead:
  • The soul initiates motion (e.g., perception, thinking), yet is also affected by motion, as seen in sensory perception emerging from bodily processes.
  • He maintains that although the soul is the cause of motion, it is not literally moved like a physical body—it is both agent and beneficiary in the chain of causality.

3. Distinguishing Types and Directions of Motion

Aristotle divides motion into several kinds:

• Generation and corruption (coming into being, passing away),
• Alteration (change of quality),
• Augmentation or diminution (change of quantity),
• Locomotion (change of place).

These categories reveal that motion involves transforming matter (hyle) into form (morphe), guided by substantial form, which gives matter its defining identity .

4. The Unmoved Mover: The Ultimate Cause of Motion

Another key concept from Aristotle’s Metaphysics is the Unmoved Mover, introduced in the context of motion’s ultimate source:

• Since all motion requires a cause, and motion is eternal, there must be a first cause—an entity that initiates motion without itself being moved.
• This mover is immaterial, perfectly actual, and moves objects by being object of desire or aspiration, not through physical interaction; it represents the highest form of intellectual activity, thought thinking itself.

5. Summary: Motion, Soul, Substance

Concept	Aristotle’s Insight
Motion	Actualization of potential—encompasses more than mere locomotion.
Soul	Internal principle of motion; enables living activity and perception.
Types of Change	Generation, alteration, growth, and movement are modes of motion.
Unmoved Mover	The timeless, immaterial source of all motion and aspiration.

Understanding Aristotle’s deeper view of motion as tied to being, potentiality, and form helps clarify how the soul acts as both cause and context of living change. It’s not just motion through space, but the foundation of becoming itself.

Aristotle on Motion, First Principles, and the Soul

1. Foundations in Metaphysics Book 1 (Part 2)

Aristotle argues that there must be a first principle—a foundational cause that underlies motion and existence—and that this principle cannot be part of an infinite regress of causes (turn0search0). He maintains:

• Infinite series of causes—whether material, efficient, or final—make knowledge and explanation impossible.
• Therefore, causation must terminate in a first cause that is not itself caused by anything else.

This first principle enables intelligibility, scientific knowledge, and avoids endless regress. It is not merely the beginning but the necessary foundation for all reality.

2. Types of Motion from Physics

In Physics, Aristotle defines motion broadly as the actualization of a potential (turn0search7). He distinguishes between different kinds:

• Locomotion (change in place) is foundational—most changes rely on the movement of objects into contact (turn0search1).
• Other forms include generation, alteration, and quantitative changes like growth or diminution.

Any change requires an efficient cause—an entity that brings about motion—along with potentiality and actuality to fuel and realize change.

3. Soul and Motion in De Anima

Aristotle identifies the soul (ψυχή) as the form or essence of a living body—not a separate substance—as the principle of life and motion (turn0search17).

• The soul is unique because it initiates motion in itself (self-moving), unlike non-living bodies which are moved by external causes (turn0search8).
• Still, other bodily motions adhere to efficient, material, and final causes.

4. Unmoved Mover: The Highest Principle in Metaphysics Book 12

Building on the need for a first principle, Aristotle describes the Unmoved Mover:

• It causes motion not by physical interaction, but through being an object of desire or thought—a perfect actuality that contemplates itself (turn0search13).
• This mover is eternal, immaterial, and provides the ultimate grounding for all motion throughout the cosmos (turn0search9).

Integrated Overview

Source	Key Contribution
Metaphysics Book 1	Establishes need for first, non-regressive causes to structure knowledge and reality
Physics	Defines motion as actualized potential; emphasizes locomotion as central to change
De Anima	Introduces the soul as the self-moving principle—cause and subject of its own change
Metaphysics Book 12	Posits the Unmoved Mover as the eternal, transcendent ground of all motion

• By insisting on a first principle, Aristotle anchors his metaphysics in a stable foundation rather than perpetual regress.
• His broader concept of motion unifies change across domains—physical, biological, and cognitive—as potential actualized.
• The soul exemplifies the self-moving cause in living beings, while the Unmoved Mover stands as the universal cause beyond all motion.
• His four causes (material, formal, efficient, final) allow comprehensive explanations of phenomena, linking concept, composition, catalyst, and purpose (turn0search16).

Aristotle writes about Democritus in his special description of the soul. He says:

“Democritus has expressed himself more ingeniously than the rest on the grounds for ascribing each of these two characters to soul; soul and mind are, he says, one and the same thing, and this thing must be one of the primary and indivisible bodies, and its power of originating movement must be due to its fineness of grain and the shape of its atoms; he says that of all the shapes the spherical is the most mobile, and that this is the shape of the particles of fire and mind.”¹

The spherical shape of the atoms is associated with soul, and the movement of the soul is directed by thought, which exhibits a “sharpness” or “fineness” of its physical grain—its resolution in reality as conceived by the observer. Democritus describes an accurate image of heat as the source of energy in atoms, but as the physical materialists commit the same mistakes today, they strip the essence of thought away from the soul. We can say that the soul possesses a spherical shape because that shape is the most mobile—capable of moving at the speed of light and is a perfect sphere—and also in that motion, heat generates from within the atom to describe its energy. We can even go further and say that this heat energy generation is the source for a life form, a living biological organism.

“Fire” in this sense is equivalent to our modern concept of energy.

Footnote

Aristotle, De Anima I.2 (404a2–5): “This is what led Democritus to say that soul is a sort of fire or hot substance; his ‘forms’ or atoms are infinite in number; those which are spherical he calls fire and soul…” (people.bu.edu) ↩

Here’s a deeper expansion on Democritus’s ontology—especially his materialist account of soul, mind, and atoms—drawing directly on Aristotle’s commentary and contextualizing it within ancient Greek thought and its legacy.

Democritus’s Ontology: Soul, Atoms, and Motion

1. Soul and Mind as Atomic Fire

Aristotle highlights Democritus’s ingenious interpretation of soul and mind in De Anima:

“Democritus has expressed himself more ingeniously… soul and mind are, he says, one and the same thing, and this thing must be one of the primary and indivisible bodies… of all the shapes the spherical is the most mobile, and that this is the shape of the particles of fire and mind.”(classics.mit.edu)

In this view, the soul (psychē) is not an immaterial essence but is composed of spherical fire-atoms. Fire symbolizes heat and energy, and spherical atoms offer maximal mobility—thus life itself arises from the motion of these finest particles.

This aligns with Democritus’s broader atomic theory, where atoms’ shape, size, and arrangement explain differences in matter—heat, perception, and cognition emerge from their configurations (Wikipedia).

2. Materialism of Cognition

Democritus explains perception and thought as material interactions:

• Sensory input = interaction between soul-atoms and external atomic images (Encyclopedia.com, plato.stanford.edu).
• Thought is a physical process, rooted in atomic collisions—he acknowledged that thought, like sensation, can be distorted (University of Notre Dame, plato.stanford.edu).
• He also concedes that true knowledge is tenuous, asserting that our sensory-based opinions may not correspond to atomistic reality (plato.stanford.edu, University of Notre Dame).

3. Atoms, Void, and the Composition of Beings

Democritus’s atomism is rooted in the idea of indivisible particles (atoms) moving through void:

• Atoms differ only in shape, size, and arrangement—not substance (plato.stanford.edu, Philosophy Stack Exchange).
• Though imperceptible, they compose everything perceptible. Change occurs via rearrangement of these atoms (plato.stanford.edu, Philosophy Stack Exchange).
• Soul-atoms (fire-like, spherical) permeate the body, and life depends on the continual intake of such atoms—death follows their dissipation (World History Encyclopedia, Encyclopedia.com).

4. Organic Unity Under Materialism

Despite his materialism, Democritus preserves a notion of purpose and fittingness in organisms:

• He notes functional adaptations in humans, likening the soul to a divine principle due to fine grain and motion-rooted capacities (University of Notre Dame).
• Yet he firmly rejects Platonic Forms and other incorporeal explanations—his universe, however ordered, remains purely material.

Concept	Democritus’s View
Soul & Mind	Identical, composed of fine, spherical fire-atoms. Mobile, heat-associated.
Cognition & Perception	Material interactions; sensory input = atomic contacts; thought = atomic motion.
Change & Reality	Results from rearrangements of atoms moving in void.
Knowledge & Truth	Sense-based knowledge is inherently uncertain; reasoning is necessary yet fallible.
Organic Adaptation	Bodies exhibit adaptive structure, but explained via material rearrangements.

Democritus presents one of the earliest materialist ontologies, attributing life, mind, and thought entirely to physical atoms. While normative in modern physics, his fusion of energy (fire), form (sphere), and substance (atoms) mapped metaphysical concepts onto proto-scientific principles—creating fertile philosophical terrain.

The logic of empiricism remains the same today as it did way back during the pre‑Socratics, but it has developed in specification and detail. Aristotle says, “Democritus does not employ mind as a special faculty dealing with truth, but identifies soul and mind.” In other words, the soul and the mind describe different sides of the same coin.

Democritus employs the empirical method to examine Nature and deduce “motion” from it, then conclude that motion is the cause of the rational order of nature. He took ‘one’ out of the ‘other’, in order to say the ‘other’ causes the ‘one’.

Modern empiricists still make the mistake of forgetting to add the mental force that “made” the natural deduction of the phenomenon. The materialist ontology simply does the following error: they strip “mind” away from every physical object, and then use mind to explain how the objects of our physical world are devoid of any rationality—it is said they are “soulless”, everything is inanimate, and there is no life in the fundamental components of our world. The later advantage of quantum mechanics remedies the materialistic fallacy by introducing the element of the “observer” as an indivisible part of any phenomenon. The advancement of quantum science begins with the introduction of the observer as a fundamental component in the physical sense.

Democritus, Empiricism, and the Quantum Observer

1. Democritus and Empirical Reductionism

Democritus’s early empiricism framed mind and soul as atomic, energetic, and inseparable—a radical integration of mind within the ontology of matter. Aristotle notes:

“Democritus says soul and mind are one and the same thing, and this must be one of the primary and indivisible bodies… of all the shapes the spherical is the most mobile… this is the shape of the particles of fire and mind.” (Nemo’s Library)

Here, thought is not an immaterial abstraction but an energetic, mobile form of atomic reality—not separable from the physical.

2. The Legacy—and Pitfall—of Materialist Empiricism

Modern empiricism, while more sophisticated, often repeats the same misstep: it excludes mind from the fabric of the physical world. Mind is relegated to a passive function—observation without agency—resulting in an ontology of “soulless” matter, devoid of intention or explanation.

3. Quantum Mechanics and the Observer

Quantum mechanics has shifted this paradigm by foregrounding the observer effect. The observer isn’t an optional addendum but an essential element in the physical phenomenon. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes:

The measurement problem and interpretative debates center on whether—and how—the observer affects the ontological status of quantum states. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Some interpretations suggest that quantum systems do not attain definite properties until observed—infusing observation with causal potency.

Aspect	Traditional Empiricism	Democritus’s View	Quantum Mechanical Insight
Mind/Soul	Omitted or passive	Integral atomic cause	Observer as causal agent
Method	Sensory data → abstraction	Observation → atomic deduction	Observation influences outcome
Ontology	Material-only	Material + mind unity	System + observer interdependence

Philosophical Implications

• Democritus integrated mind within the atomic ontology, not beyond it.
• Materialist empiricism errs by removing mind as a causal participant.
• Quantum theory rectifies this by showing that observation—and therefore agency—is entwined with physical reality.

In effect, both ancient and modern turns show that ignoring the active role of mind oversimplifies the structure of reality. A truly robust understanding must account for the interplay of material processes and mental forms.

Modern scholastics outline a hierarchy in the specialization of the sciences. It is now customary to place physics prior to biology, with chemistry situated somewhere in between. A compound such as oxygen, for example, is often considered more fundamental than the organisms that depend on it. However, there is no oxygen per se if there are no lifeforms that require it. Materialistic science tends to isolate the compound as if it exists independently from all the internal relations it presupposes in order to exist as part of nature.

We can observe this literally: in uninhabitable zones of the universe, oxygen is absent or minimal, whereas in habitable zones, it appears in abundance—not merely in trace amounts[^1].

If a compound like oxygen is isolated independently from all other things in nature, then it appears as though the existence of the compound is not dependent on anything else. However, in nature, no element is truly isolated from the requirements of other elements. Lifeforms and oxygen exist within the same ecosystem, where each depends on the other. For example, where there are lifeforms, the quantity of oxygen is often surplus; while in empty space or on lifeless planets, oxygen is scarce[^2].

Of course, one can always find traces of nearly every chemical compound at the subatomic level. However, this should not be taken to suggest that just because a compound is found—however minimally—it is, in any meaningful sense, more fundamental than the other aspects it depends upon when it exists within an environment where it is abundant[^3].

Footnotes:

[^1]: The Earth’s oxygen-rich atmosphere is largely the result of biological processes, particularly photosynthesis by cyanobacteria and plants. Without life, atmospheric oxygen would quickly bind with surface materials and disappear.

[^2]: For instance, Mars has only 0.13% oxygen in its atmosphere compared to Earth’s 21%, reflecting its lack of significant biological activity.

[^3]: Fundamental status in science often refers to explanatory power across multiple domains, but ontological dependence—i.e., what depends on what for its existence—is a separate metaphysical question that may invert scientific hierarchies.

If oxygen is just one element among other elements, without the necessity of life, then it belongs to the lower levels of the chemical hierarchy of fundamental importance. The higher the periodic number, the less fundamental the compound tends to be—that is, the less abundant it is. For example, hydrogen is number 1 because it is abundant everywhere in the universe. It is not divided into places; it is equally and finely spread out everywhere. As a diatomic molecule, it can only exist by bonding to another hydrogen atom. In other words, it is always the same itself[^1].

The ancient empirical observation that motion originates in mind is specified as air, which was viewed as more fundamental than the organism. A modern reiteration of this is the concept of “oxygen,” whereby ancient “air” is understood as more fundamental than the lifeforms that use it for respiration. However, this is only to say that air, as an element, is more fundamental than any finite and particular lifeform that uses it for respiration. This is not the same conclusion if we compare lifeforms as a species or class in nature.

If we ask: If all lifeforms in general no longer exist—i.e., all lifeforms go out of existence, including plants and algae—does the existence of air (oxygen) remain?

The answer to this question is more complicated, and it is not easily given. If the only distinct quality of air (or oxygen) is to bear life, then it would not exist without life. And if its existence is permanent, then it cannot be differentiated from any other chemical; it may revert back to a more basic one, like helium or hydrogen[^2].

Footnotes:

[^1]: Hydrogen is the most abundant element in the universe, making up roughly 75% of its elemental mass. Its simplicity—comprising just one proton and one electron—makes it highly stable and fundamental in cosmological terms.

[^2]: Without photosynthetic organisms producing free oxygen, Earth’s atmosphere would gradually lose its oxygen content as it oxidizes surface materials or escapes into space. This suggests that oxygen’s abundance is not an independent feature of matter, but one contingent on biological activity. Over geological timescales, in the absence of life, oxygen could indeed convert into other forms or cease to exist in its free molecular state.

Aristotle says about the atomist connection of form with matter, soul having a geometric form of a (spherical) atom:

The spherical atoms are identified with soul because atoms of that shape are most adapted to permeate everywhere and to set all the others in motion by being themselves in movement. This implies the view that the soul is identical with that which produces movement in animals. That is why, further, they regard respiration as the characteristic mark of life: as the environment compresses the bodies of animals and tends to extrude those atoms which impart movement to them—because these atoms themselves are never at rest—there must be a reinforcement of them by similar atoms coming in from without, in the act of respiration. For they prevent the extrusion of those already within by counteracting the compressing and consolidating force of the environment; and animals continue to live only so long as they are able to maintain this resistance”[^1].

The implication here is that the activity of breathing is synonymous with the geometry akin to the atomic body of air that facilitates respiration. Animals do not derive the value of air merely by inhaling it, but instead, they acquire oxygen through exhalation, by converting oxygen into carbon dioxide. In other words, it is through the production of a different element against oxygen that oxygen is preserved—by receiving it through this dialectical process. The generation of oxygen exists in the act of exhaling, not inhaling. Therefore, the organism itself produces the very compound it inhales inward, in exchange for another compound—namely, the newly generated carbon dioxide[^2].

Modern empirical assessments state that respiration requires air because it is a material substance metabolized by the respiratory organ and because it is required for life. Yet, this order of foundation confuses the elemental material (air) as prior to the organism’s mind, which is capable of respiration. According to the Greeks, the activity of respiration is the soul of the atoms forming the element air. The lifeform is the soul of the environment. This is perhaps difficult to grasp because there seems to be an obvious asymmetrical balance between organism and environment.

Why does it appear that the environment exhibits a magnitude far greater than the organisms residing within it? The largest ant colony does not come close to the scale of the grassland it inhabits. This is because the organism ventures off beyond its environment[^3].

Aristotle says that Anaxagoras “seems to distinguish between soul and mind, but in practice he treats them as a single substance, except that it is mind that he specially posits as the principle of all things; at any rate what he says is that mind alone is of all things simple, unmixed, and pure. He assigns both characteristics—knowing and origination of movement—to the same principle, when he says that it was mind that set the whole in movement”[^4].

Plato says that “Animal-itself is compounded of the Idea itself of the One, together with the primary length, breadth, and depth; everything else, the objects of its perception, being similarly constituted”[^5].

“Mind is the monad; science or knowledge the dyad (because it goes undeviatingly from one point to another); opinion is the number of the plane; sensation the number of the solid. The numbers are by him expressly identified with the Forms themselves, or principles, and are formed out of the elements”[^6].

For both Anaxagoras and Plato, mind is the purest element in the world.

Thales, too, judging from what is recorded of him, seems to have held that soul is a motive force, since he said that the magnet has a soul in it because it moves iron[^7].

“Place,” according to Aristotle, is movement natural to the soul. Place is not merely location but the primal state of a thing’s condition.

If the natural movement of the soul is upward, then the soul must be fire; if downward, it must be earth. For upward and downward motions are the definitive characteristics of these bodies[^8].

The place of fire is its upward motion.

Place is also not merely the space in which an entity finds itself, but is a property of movement.

“Since the soul is observed to originate movement in the body, it is reasonable to suppose that it transmits to the body the movements by which it itself is moved; and so, reversing the order, we may infer from the movements of the body back to similar movements of the soul”[^9].

Thus, the body is simply the movement of the soul.

Footnotes:

[^1]: See Aristotle, De Anima (On the Soul), where early thinkers—particularly Democritus—associate spherical atoms with soul due to their capacity to initiate motion and permeate bodies.

[^2]: While biologically organisms inhale oxygen and exhale carbon dioxide, philosophically this inversion plays on the dialectic of creation through opposition—a process in which being sustains itself through becoming its contrary.

[^3]: This could be interpreted through the lens of phenomenology: organisms are situated within environments, but their intentions and actions often exceed spatial limitations, suggesting a metaphysical transcendence of context.

[^4]: Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I. This reflects how Anaxagoras considered Nous (Mind) to be the initiating principle of all motion and order.

[^5]: Plato, Timaeus, where the “Animal-itself” represents the cosmic soul—constructed through geometric forms and the elements.

[^6]: This is drawn from Neopythagorean and Platonic interpretations, particularly in later commentaries such as those by Speusippus and Numenius, who blend number theory with metaphysics.

[^7]: Aristotle attributes this view to Thales in De Anima, suggesting that for early thinkers, motion was the sign of life—and hence of soul.

[^8]: Aristotle, Physics IV and De Caelo, where each element has a “natural place” and motion—fire upwards, earth downwards—which reflects the orientation of the soul’s nature.

[^9]: Aristotle, De Anima III.7, where he considers whether the soul’s movements correspond to bodily movements and whether one can infer the soul’s nature through the body’s behavior.

The notion of the soul and its relationship to the body is a basic understanding of consciousness and environment, or thought and object. The common image of the soul “leaving the body,” though flawed in many ways, still holds a fundamental intuition: that when the soul “leaves,” the image of it going outside suggests an intuition that the environment or the world is an extension of the mind[^1]. The mind is able to extend itself into the environment.

Aristotle critiques Plato’s idea of the soul being able to transfer between bodies, because he emphasizes the importance of the body that receives the soul. In other words, the soul is the essential idea of the body, providing it with the kind of form it exhibits[^2]. You cannot have any soul simply jump into any body.

Kant goes further in this examination of the soul. Hegel writes:

“The first unconditioned that he [Kant] considers is the soul (see §34)—in everything manifold of which I am conscious—as something identical, as something that distinguishes me as thinking from everything outside me.”[^3]

Footnotes:

[^1]: This idea resonates with certain idealist and phenomenological perspectives, particularly in thinkers like Berkeley and Merleau-Ponty, where the external world is not wholly independent of mind but co-constituted by perception and intentionality.

[^2]: Aristotle in De Anima defines the soul (psyche) as the “first actuality of a natural body which has life potentially.” The soul is not separate from the body like a ghostly substance, but the form that actualizes a living being. Thus, not every body can house every kind of soul; each soul is suited to a specific kind of organism.

[^3]: Hegel, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, §34. Hegel is commenting on Kant’s treatment of the soul in the Critique of Pure Reason, particularly the Transcendental Deduction and Paralogisms, where Kant examines the idea of the self as a unity of apperception—i.e., the “I think” that accompanies all representations.

The procedure of traditional metaphysics is correctly specified by saying that it sets the corresponding categories, or thought-determinations, in place of empirical determinations. This gives rise to four propositions:

(a) the soul is a substance;
(b) it is a simple substance;
(c) it is numerically identical with respect to the various times of its being-there;
(d) it stands in relationship to what is spatial[^1].

For that matter, it is quite correct to say that predicates like simplicity, unalterableness, etc., cannot be applied to the soul. This is not for the reason that Kant gives, however—namely, that reason would thereby overstep the limit assigned to it—but because the abstract determinations of the understanding are not sufficient for the soul, which is something quite other than the merely simple, unalterable, and so on[^2].

For instance, the soul is certainly simple self-identity; but at the same time, because it is active, it distinguishes itself inwardly—whereas what is only simple (i.e., simple in an abstract way) is, for that very reason, also dead at the same time[^3].

The fact that, through his polemic against the older metaphysics, Kant removed these predicates from the soul and the spirit must be regarded as a great result. But the reason he gives for doing so is quite wrong[^4].

Footnotes:

[^1]: These four propositions correspond to the Paralogisms of Pure Reason in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant critiques the rationalist metaphysical claims about the soul—particularly its status as a substance, its simplicity, its identity over time, and its non-spatial nature.

[^2]: Kant argues that concepts such as “substance” and “simplicity” are categories of the understanding that can only be applied within the bounds of possible experience. Since the soul is not an object of sensory intuition, he concludes that these predicates cannot be justifiably applied to it. However, Hegel critiques this limitation as overly formal and lacking dialectical depth.

[^3]: In Hegelian metaphysics, simplicity in the abstract (i.e., undifferentiated unity) is not adequate to describe the soul, which is self-related negativity—a unity that differentiates itself within itself. True identity involves internal differentiation, not mere lack of parts or change.

[^4]: Hegel sees Kant’s removal of traditional predicates from the soul as a positive development, but believes Kant does so for the wrong reason—namely, because of an external limit imposed on reason. Hegel’s own system seeks to overcome this limitation through speculative dialectics, which reintroduce substance, identity, and selfhood at a higher conceptual level.

(DNA is structure body)

Baruch Spinoza, in a clear manner, explains the relationship between thought and matter. He says:

“The thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute, now under that. So also a mode of extension and the idea of that extension is one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways.”[^1]

Spinoza argues that mental substances and material substances are not different substances but different ways the one substance is expressed. The nature of mental substance exhibits ideas, whereas the nature of material extension exhibits physical objects. Spinoza, however, says that this distinction between these different attributes does not mean that there are two different substances. He elaborates:

“The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.”[^2]

This means that for every physical object in the world, there is an exactly corresponding mode of thought—there is an idea of that object. Spinoza calls this collective mode of thought the mind of God[^3]. Like Aristotle, the term “God” in the metaphysical sense does not correspond to the scholastic Christian interpretation of the term.

This conception of reason, shared by all philosophers mentioned thus far, is not reducible to the materialist idea that mind somehow arises from matter. Nor does it mean that material nature is really just mental. The material world, in this sense, is not just made up of ideas about objects, but rather the form that makes up the object and also its matter—that is felt—are both ideas of it[^4].

This notion indicates that every object is inherently an idea, not in the sense that there are ideas about objects, but that the object is, in its nature, an idea[^5]. This is why, as discussed earlier in chapter one, the idea is received by the intellect rather than conjured up by it. Of course, the intellect is fallible to misapprehension, but as stated earlier, all such misapprehensions of thought are derived from the limited but necessary faculty of mind: the understanding[^6].

Footnotes:

[^1]: Ethics Part II, Proposition 7, Scholium. Spinoza argues that thought and extension are two of the infinite attributes of a single substance, which he identifies with God or Nature (Deus sive Natura).

[^2]: Ethics Part II, Proposition 7. This is known as the parallelism between thought and extension. Every mode of extension (i.e., a physical event or object) has a corresponding mode of thought (i.e., an idea).

[^3]: Spinoza’s “mind of God” is not a personal deity but the infinite intellect that includes all ideas. Each finite mind is a part of this divine intellect. See Ethics Part II, Proposition 11.

[^4]: This recalls Aristotle’s hylomorphism, where every physical object is a composite of form and matter. In Spinoza’s terms, both form and matter are expressions of ideas, though not reducible to mental content alone.

[^5]: This perspective approaches idealism, though Spinoza is not an idealist in the strict Berkeleyan sense. For Spinoza, everything that exists is an expression of the divine substance; hence, all things are intelligible as ideas.

[^6]: In Ethics Part II, Spinoza distinguishes between adequate ideas (those which correspond to their causes and are true) and inadequate ideas (which arise from confused or partial understanding). Misapprehension stems from the limitations of the finite intellect, not from the nature of the object.

It is important to understand the relation between physical substances in contrast to mental substances. We have a pretty good understanding of what the former is, but barely any idea of what mental substances mean. It remains difficult to understand mental substance as something distinct from the physical—which, in reality, it is not—but it must be differentiated for the understanding[^1].

Ordinarily, mental substances are thought of as the images of the mind—that is, the way of thinking. But mental substances bear an existence beyond our individual mental thinking. Mental substances are what physical substances are in the abstract[^2]. By this is meant that they are the essence of the physical substances. But also, the mental is the dimension of the physical when it is not directly determined—it is in a state of uncertainty, in an indeterminate or potential state[^3].

They are the experiences of the physical—how the physical operates in the world. From solid to liquid—the physical substances merely tell us how that transformation happens, but not why. In one sense, it explains that water turns from a liquid to a solid because the temperature is below 0°C. But that’s just answering one cause with another, and so we can ask an infinity of why’s—i.e., why is the temperature below 0?[^4]

This brings us to the relation between essence and appearance. Appearance is the reflection of essence, so that consciousness can see its idea. In order for its idea to belong to it, consciousness must reflect its idea away from its essence, and this reflection of essence is the appearance[^5]. The appearance shows the essence so that consciousness can begin to make its idea real.

But appearance is just the potentiality of the essence, whereas essence is its actuality. And it is the turning of potentiality into actuality that is the process consciousness takes to be external from itself. But only in this externality can consciousness really claim that its idea belongs to itself[^6].

Because not only must the idea be actual internally—internal in the abstract—the idea must also be true externally for consciousness—the external being the concrete. The actuality of its idea depends on consciousness taking its abstract idea and making it concrete. Its own thinking becomes its object—but that object is itself thinking. And in this thinking, consciousness thinks about its idea[^7].

Only when consciousness takes its abstract idea and sees how that idea is in the concrete can consciousness be sure that it is real. And so, the relation between appearance and essence manifests in what consciousness calls the object of itself—that is, self-consciousness[^8].

Footnotes:

[^1]: In Spinoza’s Ethics, particularly Part II, he denies the existence of two separate substances (mind and body). Instead, he asserts that there is only one substance expressed in multiple attributes—chiefly thought and extension. These are not different things, but different modes of understanding the same reality.

[^2]: The idea that mental substance is the abstract essence of physical substance echoes Spinoza’s parallelism: each physical mode corresponds to a mental mode. For Spinoza, the “idea” of something is its essence under the attribute of thought.

[^3]: This aligns with a Spinozistic reinterpretation of potentia (power or potential), which exists in an indeterminate form until actualized. Hegel also discusses a similar dialectic between potentiality (possibility) and actuality in Science of Logic.

[^4]: This critique mirrors what Aristotle called the infinite regress of causes, and what Kant later frames as the problem of conditioned causality. One explanation leads to another unless a grounding principle is found—not just in efficient causes but in essence or form.

[^5]: Hegel, in his Phenomenology of Spirit, develops the idea that appearance (Erscheinung) is not illusory, but the way essence reveals itself. Consciousness must negate its immediate idea (in abstraction) to see it “reflected” in the world.

[^6]: For Hegel, the self-realization of Spirit involves alienation from itself (externalization), only to return to itself enriched. This externalization is necessary for the idea to become concrete and truly known.

[^7]: Here, thought becomes reflexive—it does not just think about objects, it thinks about its own thinking. This is the core of self-consciousness, where the subject makes itself into an object and thereby gains knowledge of its own essence.

[^8]: Self-consciousness, in Hegel’s terms, is consciousness of consciousness. It is not merely knowing something external, but knowing that the known is a reflection of itself. This unity of knower and known is the beginning of freedom in speculative thought.

In self-consciousness, appearance and essence exist as a unity—but that very unity is an inversion: the appearance being the external reflection of the essence, which is internal. The appearance in self-consciousness is matter, whereas the essence is Reason[^1]. The human being is that which looks at itself and is unsatisfied with its appearances. And this discontentment is what shapes what it appears to be as what it essentially is.

How does the essence interact with appearance to make itself the object? On the one hand, the appearance is already the reflection of the essence, but this reflection is the abstraction of essence. In order to turn the abstraction into essence itself, it is necessary to have knowledge of itself[^2].

This connects with Socrates’ theory that knowledge is a process of recollection (anamnesis)[^3]. What Socrates really means by this is disputed to this day. Recollection assumes that knowledge is the bringing into consciousness what is already there.

Stages of Recollection

First, recollection involves having knowledge about the external world, whether it be empirical, mathematical, logical, etc. This I call the formal stage[^4]. Once this information is gathered and the formal stage satisfied, one must engage in the natural stage of recollection.

In this stage, one simply listens or becomes receptive to their own thinking. This occurs by simply thinking—not just about anything, but about thinking itself[^5]. The content does not matter, because it is produced by thought. You do not think about something; rather, thinking produces something.

This then requires all the learned knowledge, which becomes naturally elucidated when thinking about thinking is done. In this stage, the mind enters the realm of consciousness, where it simply listens and receives the ideas of truth. Such ideas of truth are only delivered by way of mathematical, logical, and correct thinking. Otherwise, it results in fancies and imagination[^6].

This I call the natural stage, because it is literally the organic process given by nature to self-consciousness. It is the natural process whereby essence derives knowledge about its appearance. This is not to be mistaken with a priori knowledge—whatever that means[^7]. Knowledge is the experience of self-consciousness.

Knowledge as Phenomenon of Experience

Knowledge is the phenomenon of experience, because every experience—when one is conscious of it—is knowledge. And so one can look at anything and derive knowledge about the nature of the whole[^8]. This is the methodology of self-consciousness itself.

Many people are stuck at the formal stage without ever applying the learned sciences. The sciences are just studied without being applied to what they are made for—that is, for consciousness. Once you derive knowledge of the sciences, you apply those to your consciousness. And in this application, you derive the nature of the sciences in expressing ultimate truth[^9].

Footnotes:

[^1]: In Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, self-consciousness arises when consciousness becomes aware that the appearance (the external object) is not separate from the essence (the self or reason). The duality collapses into unity through recognition.

[^2]: This is an echo of Hegel’s idea that truth must be actual—not merely abstract. To know oneself, the self must become an object to itself, transforming abstract reflection into actual self-knowledge.

[^3]: In Plato’s Meno and Phaedo, anamnesis is the doctrine that all knowledge is recollection of eternal truths the soul knew before embodiment. Hegel interprets this in terms of Reason becoming conscious of itself—where the Idea is immanent, not transcendent.

[^4]: The formal stage is comparable to the stage of Understanding in Hegel’s system, where thought organizes phenomena through categories, but without yet grasping their unity in spirit or concept.

[^5]: This is central to Hegelian reflexivity. Genuine thinking does not merely contemplate content; it reflects on its own activity. This is the step toward absolute knowing, where the knower and known are united.

[^6]: For both Plato and Hegel, true ideas must be grounded in rational form—that is, necessity, not contingency. The distinction between thinking and fancy lies in whether the thought is self-grounding or not.

[^7]: A critique of Kantian a priori, which separates form and content in knowledge. Your view suggests instead that all knowledge arises within experience, but in such a way that the structure of experience itself is rational and self-reflective.

[^8]: This recalls the hermeneutic circle—the idea that one can know the whole through the part, and vice versa. In Hegelian terms, concrete universality is grasped in every singular instance when mediated by self-conscious reflection.

[^9]: The ultimate purpose of science, in this framework, is not merely external explanation but the realization of consciousness—the idea that truth becomes actual only when thought recognizes itself in the object.