1.72 Atomic Progression

Section 69 (first updated 1.11.2022)

Ethical Problem of Rationalization

The problem is the same as the advantage for the human being: their capacity to reason. Both make them distinct in a positive manner from the animals, as they can organize and structure society based upon ideas. At the same time, that rationalization—that capacity to use reason to otherwise unquestioned objects, to bring the implicit world of reason that lies in things into explicit consciousness—is also the moral deficit as well.[^1] When humans over-rationalize things, especially in moral and ethical affairs, we can justify things with enough reason that are otherwise immoral and justify them into becoming moral. How much reason can we throw at a moral conundrum and bring some rational outcome to it? This is the issue of morality.

The same capacity that allows human beings to rise above immediate instinct and organize their existence according to ideas can therefore become the source of a fundamental danger. Reason does not necessarily distinguish between what is moral and what can simply be made to appear moral through sufficient justification. The human being can take an action, an institution, or an idea that would otherwise remain unquestioned and subject it to rationalization. In doing so, the human being can make the implicit assumptions within that object explicit, examine them, reorganize them, and ultimately produce a rational justification for them. Yet the fact that something can be rationally justified does not necessarily mean that it is morally justified.[^2]

This creates a tension within human rationality itself. Reason is capable of criticizing morality, but it is also capable of defending immorality. It can expose contradictions within an ethical system, but it can also construct elaborate arguments that conceal or excuse those contradictions. In this sense, the problem is not simply whether human beings possess reason, but how far reason can be extended into the moral sphere before rationalization begins to transform the immoral into something that appears moral. There is always the possibility that the human being can throw enough reason at a moral conundrum that the original moral difficulty becomes obscured by the rational outcome.

This is perhaps why rationalization has an ambiguous relationship with morality. On one side, rationalization allows us to question customs, traditions, and assumptions that might otherwise remain unquestioned. It gives us the ability to bring what is implicit into explicit consciousness and therefore allows us to examine the foundations upon which our moral world is constructed. But on the other side, that same process can become excessive. When everything is subjected to rational calculation, morality itself can become something that is calculated, organized, and justified rather than something that places limits upon our rationalization.

Yet in science, over-rationalization might be positive. Science can delve deeply into the very inner core of objects, discovering their primal and most fundamental operations.[^3] What is implicit within an object can be brought into explicit consciousness through rational investigation. The scientist does not merely accept the object as it appears; they question it, break it down, organize its components, and attempt to understand the principles through which it operates. In this sense, rationalization becomes productive because it allows the human being to move beyond the immediate appearance of things and discover their deeper structure.

The difference, then, may lie in the object toward which rationalization is directed. In science, the rationalization of the object can reveal something that was already implicit within it: its structure, its operations, and its fundamental principles. In morality, however, rationalization can become self-justifying. The human being is not merely discovering the structure of an object but is also determining how an action, institution, or decision ought to be understood and justified. Reason therefore becomes capable not only of discovering but of legitimizing.

This is what makes reason both the advantage and the problem of the human being. It distinguishes human beings from animals because it allows them to organize society based upon ideas, to make the implicit explicit, and to consciously structure the world around them. But because the human being can rationalize, they can also rationalize almost anything. The same capacity that allows us to discover truth can be used to construct justification; the same reason that can uncover the fundamental operations of things can be directed toward making an immoral action appear moral. The power of reason therefore contains within itself both the possibility of human advancement and the possibility of moral deficit.

[^1]: Here, “moral deficit” does not necessarily mean that reason itself is immoral. Rather, the deficit emerges when the capacity for rationalization is treated as sufficient justification for moral legitimacy.

[^2]: This distinction resembles the difference between explaining or justifying an action rationally and establishing that the action is actually morally permissible. A sufficiently elaborate argument can explain why someone acted without proving that the action was right.

[^3]: The contrast with science is important: scientific rationalization generally attempts to uncover structures and operations that are independent of our preferences, whereas moral rationalization can be entangled with human interests, desires, and attempts at self-justification.

Space of Self-externality

Space is always the externality of the object, so that when the internal relations of logic produce the self-identical and contained one-dimensional circle, space is the externalization of this into three possibilities. These are the dimensions of time in space, known as the past, present, and future (Law of Mind, 535).[^1] These, however, are not mere moments, but are themselves the laws of thought forming three external positions in space. Space is therefore not simply an empty container in which objects happen to exist; rather, it is the externality through which the internal relations of the object become disclosed.

Space is three-dimensional, meaning that it is disclosed within a singularity: a point. The point is the most immediate determination of space because it is contained within itself, yet it is also the beginning from which space can be extended outside that point while remaining an identity. The line, or extension in space, therefore represents the movement of the point beyond its immediate singularity while still preserving a relation to that original identity. The line is the point externalized, extended beyond itself, and yet still maintaining itself as the same determination.[^2]

From this, space can further become spherical. The sphere becomes an object that discloses both the second- and first-dimensional dynamics within it. It contains the point and the line as determinations within its own externality: the point as singularity, the line as extension, and the sphere as the more complete externalized object in which these previous determinations are preserved.[^3] In this sense, the dimensions are not merely separate mathematical measurements but can be understood as different dynamics of the object as it becomes external to itself.

Space can ultimately be an infinite number of dimensions. Yet our philosophical notion that space is not actually an absolute externality, in the sense that everything is generally outside space, appears to be true from observation. Everything that we observe appears to be external, positioned outside something else, and therefore spatially determined. Yet observation and the mind initially do not grasp the subtle implicitness within this apparent externality.[^4] What appears to be the most external determination is itself disclosed within vision, or through the means of the observer. The phenomenon is always disclosed by an observer, and therefore space as an externality is not simply something existing absolutely outside consciousness. It is also the condition through which the relation between the object and the observer becomes disclosed.

Therefore, space as an externality is only absolute in the sense that in the relation between any object and another object there is also its external position, which is not it. Because it is specific, what it is not becomes everything else. The particular therefore immediately implies the universal. The opposite scale of a particular is universal and generally infinite.[^5] If the object is a finite determination, then what lies outside that determination is, in principle, everything that the object is not. The externality of the particular therefore expands toward infinity because the negation of a specific object is not another single object but the totality of what lies outside its specific determination.

Space is therefore an element and part of a specific and particular thing, but it is also its opposite or inverse in scale and magnitude: the infinity or universal. Yet the universal is still attached to that finite determination that is the point. The point does not simply disappear into infinity; rather, infinity is disclosed through the externality of the point itself. The finite therefore contains a relation to the infinite precisely because it is finite. Its limitation establishes an outside, and that outside, insofar as it is not limited by the same determination, tends toward the universal.[^6]

Space, having these distinct dimensions, can therefore be understood as the dynamics of the object operating in space for an external observer that discloses the motion and phenomenon. The point, line, surface, sphere, and potentially infinite dimensions are not merely static geometrical descriptions but determinations through which the object becomes externally intelligible. The internal identity of the object becomes externalized, and this externalization is disclosed through spatial relations.

The important point is therefore that space is not simply an empty externality existing independently of the object. Space is the externality of the object itself. The object is internally related through its logical determinations, but when these relations become externalized, they appear as spatial determinations. The observer encounters these determinations as dimensions, positions, movements, and phenomena. What is internally implicit therefore becomes externally explicit through space.

In this sense, space and the object cannot be completely separated. The object determines an externality because it is something particular and therefore necessarily has an outside, something that it is not. But because this outside contains everything that the object is not, the externality of the finite object opens toward the universal and the infinite. Space is consequently both the most immediate externality of the object and the field in which the finite object enters into relation with everything outside itself. The dimensions of space are therefore not merely measurements of an already-existing external world; they are the disclosed dynamics through which the object, its negation, its relations, and its movement become phenomena for an observer.

[^1]: The reference to Law of Mind, p. 535, appears to be functioning here as the textual basis for connecting the determinations of past, present, and future with the spatial externalization of thought. The argument treats these not merely as chronological moments but as determinate relations within the structure of thought.

[^2]: The point and line can therefore be read as successive determinations of externality: the point is immediate singularity, while the line is the extension of that singularity beyond itself. “Exception” in the original formulation appears to mean “extension”; if “exception” is intentional as a technical term, it can be restored.

[^3]: The sphere is significant because it does not simply add another dimension to the line. It contains the previous determinations within a more developed spatial totality. The point and line remain implicit within the spherical determination.

[^4]: “Implicitness” here is important because the immediately observed object does not necessarily disclose the logical relations that constitute its appearance. What is externally given can therefore contain relations that are not immediately visible to observation.

[^5]: The movement from particular to universal is central to the argument. A particular object is defined partly by what it is not; therefore, the negation of its particularity opens onto an increasingly comprehensive externality.

[^6]: The finite and infinite are therefore not treated as completely independent opposites. The finite points toward the infinite precisely because its finitude establishes a boundary beyond which its own determination does not extend. Infinity is consequently disclosed through the limitation of the finite itself.

Time is one-dimensional

Time, however, we associate with the one-dimensional object, or it is one-dimensional because it is just moving forward. It is the truth of pure energy: constantly happening, always moving forward without end, never repeating again in the exact same way, but always circling ever so closely toward becoming approximately similar, while always remaining different. It is the essence of novelty and the source of becoming, generation, and degeneration.[^1]

This happening within the realm of space takes on externality, and this externality takes on infinite dimensions. Now, the three fundamental dimensions of which we described are, first, a self-disclosed identity: the point; second, the line, an extended self-identical difference, an opposition maintaining an identity; and third, a sphere, the final outcome or object-form that this dynamical process takes.[^2]

Yet if we expand into the fourth dimension and beyond, these forms take on a complexity of figure, and they become exponential in their complex variation of preservation. The past, for example, in the fourth dimension takes this complex object of a third-dimensional figure and extends it into a network of connections, extended into lines and connected with each other as points of the same figure. The same figure therefore takes on an exponential growth in its dimensional complexity that preserves all the past dimensions, each in their own potential variability, while resolving it into a single form.[^3]

Time therefore introduces something different from the mere spatial externality of the object. Space gives the object its external dimensions, while time introduces the dynamical movement through which the object becomes, changes, generates, and degenerates. The object does not simply exist as a fixed spatial determination; it is continuously being transformed through the movement of time. Each moment preserves something of what came before while simultaneously becoming something new.[^4]

This is why time can be associated with the one-dimensional movement forward. Its direction is not simply a geometrical direction but the direction of becoming itself. Pure energy is therefore characterized by this continuous happening: it does not return to an identical point in precisely the same manner, but it can circle back toward approximately similar configurations. Novelty is produced precisely because repetition is never absolute. What appears to repeat is always transformed by the movement that has already occurred.

The dimensions of space, when taken together with this temporal movement, therefore produce increasingly complex forms of externality. The point is the self-disclosed identity; the line is the extension of that identity into difference and opposition; and the sphere is the object-form that emerges from the dynamical relation between these determinations. Beyond this, the fourth dimension does not merely add another simple direction in the same way that the line adds extension to the point. Rather, it allows the previous dimensions to become preserved within a more complex network of relations.[^5]

The fourth dimension therefore contains the possibility of preserving the previous figure while simultaneously transforming it. The past is not simply destroyed when the present emerges. Rather, the past remains as a determination within the new form, and the new form carries forward the potential variability of what preceded it. Each additional dimension can consequently be understood as adding another level in which the previous determinations are preserved, connected, and reorganized.

The complexity therefore becomes exponential because every new dimensional determination does not merely add something external to what came before; it creates new possible relations among all the previous determinations. A point can become a line, a line can become a figure, and the figure can become a network of relations in which its previous dimensions are retained. The higher-dimensional object therefore becomes increasingly complex because it contains within itself the potential relations of the dimensions that preceded it.[^6]

Time, then, is the dynamical principle through which this preservation and transformation occurs. It is the movement that carries the object from one determination to another, preserving the past while generating novelty in the present and opening the possibility of the future. Space provides the externality of these determinations, while time provides their becoming. The two therefore disclose different aspects of the same dynamical process: space as externality and time as movement, generation, and transformation.

[^1]: The claim that time is “one-dimensional” here is being used philosophically rather than as a strict statement of modern physics. The emphasis is on the directed succession of becoming: one moment follows another without requiring exact repetition.

[^2]: These three determinations are being treated as a developmental sequence rather than merely as the conventional geometrical dimensions of length, width, and height. The point represents identity, the line introduces extension and difference, and the sphere represents a more complete object-form.

[^3]: “Preservation” is important to the argument because the higher-dimensional form does not simply eliminate the lower-dimensional forms. Instead, each previous determination remains contained within the more complex form while being reorganized through new relations.

[^4]: This connects time to becoming. The object in time is not simply an object that exists at different moments; it is an object whose identity is continually being modified through the succession of those moments.

[^5]: The fourth dimension is therefore being interpreted as an increase in relational complexity. Rather than imagining it simply as another spatial axis, the argument treats it as a determination in which the previous three-dimensional figure can be extended through its relations and connections.

[^6]: The phrase “exponential growth” is used here conceptually to describe the increasing number of possible relations among preserved determinations. It should not necessarily be understood as a precise mathematical claim about the dimensional growth of geometrical objects.

Negative and Positive Determinations

The laws of thought in external relations take on negative and positive energy determinations. The principle of identity, as one external relation, takes on the possible locomotion state of: 1) positive + positive = positive. The principle of difference, as another external relation, takes on the possible locomotion state of: 2) negative + positive = negative. Finally, the principle of their opposition takes on the possible locomotion state of: 3) negative + negative = positive.

For example:

Figure: Three dimensions of time in space

The one-dimensional circle takes on three external possible motions in space. For example, P, Q, and O characterize identity, difference, and opposition as external relations constituting different possibilities in space. For example:

Figure: These are all the possibilities of time in space that take on positions

Q	P	O
Positive	Negative	Negative
Positive	Positive	Positive
Positive	Negative	Negative

Each of these external relations exhibits a particular possibility of time in space. The contradictions between the logical principles are the source for varying energy states. These external relations of time manifest as the atom. The atom is the basic unit of matter because it is the most stable possible relation between space and time.^1 The photon, which is the particle of light, is a fundamental atom.^2 According to modern physics, the photon exhibits a “wave-particle dualism,” indicating that light is both a particle and a wave. The dual nature of light is based on the primary logic of space in relation with time. For example, the particle property of the photon is characterized by the abstract nature of the period, and the wave property of the photon is characterized by the abstract nature of the line. The duality of the photon to behave as both particle and wave is based on the nature of the circle as consisting of the period and the line in the plane.

The opposition between the wave and particle properties of light itself takes on form. The excluded middle of the duality constitutes a whole new determination. Light is the determination that takes its identity as something external and so it is the first self-contained dimension with density.^3 In this way, the form of the photon is logically spherical. In ancient Oriental traditions and today in modern science, light is the primary nature of matter. This is why, for instance, no object can go faster than the speed of light, because light is the quantitative limit of matter. What about the nature of the atom as the basic unit of matter?

The atom consists of a nucleus composed of protons and sometimes neutrons, with an electron. For the Greeks, the proton means “first,” and Aristotle refers to this nature as the “primary.”^4 The proton is the most stable possible external relation of time in space. For example:

According to modern physics, the proton consists of two Up and one Down quarks; but these are really just the determinations of identity and difference that take on energy properties, i.e., the two positives characterize the two Up quarks, and one negative characterizes the one Down quark.^5 The determinations of two positives and one negative characterize the quark configuration of the proton. The proton is the most stable possible energy state because it is logically valid. The electron, on the other hand, has no quark configuration, and it is only the negative charge. The electron on its own is pure negation, only existing in coordination with the proton.

Electron is an instantaneous point flash—tug and pull

We commonly have the figure of an atom where the electron is orbiting around a proton and neutron. But this characterization is a limited abstraction because it catalogues the properties of the atom as features distinct from each other, when really they are moments of the same happening. For one thing, the illustration is two-dimensional; this is a deconstruction of a multi-dimensional entity. For example, an electron is illustrated as a circle and a point in that circle, denoting a negative. That point on the circle we presume is the electron as an object, while the circle is its orbit around the nucleus. The electron, however, is not an object in the sense of being a concentrated energy point, because that is what the proton is.

Footnotes

1. University of Oregon, “Atomic Structure.”
2. University of Oregon, “Quantum Physics.”
3. Hegel, Philosophy of Nature, p. 219.
4. Aristotle, Metaphysics, I.9, trans. W. D. Ross.
5. University of Oregon, “Elementary Particles.”

Electron, Nucleus, and Organicism

The electron, in its more three-dimensional state, forms a sphere around the nucleus, and the “point” aspect of the electron is simply meant to demonstrate its probabilistic nature. It is also incorrect to say that the electron has the probability of popping up anywhere around the nucleus because it is not merely a point of energy but a distribution of energy. The point aspect of the electron is the means from which we measure the electron, and we mistakenly take that as being the electron as a point. The means of measurement has a place on the distribution to derive an abstraction of it, but we assume that this abstraction is the electron as a point. The probabilistic side of the electron as a place anywhere around the nucleus is really the action of flickering, or the sphere coming in and out of existence as an energy source around the nucleus.

The nucleus of the atom consists of a proton and neutron, both of which have the same mass, but the proton is the active side, having an electric side, while the neutron, in a sense, is negative by having no electric charge.^1 Common understanding views the atom as an object, and this is influenced by the implicit ontology of atomism in the sciences, like physics. Atomism views the atom as consisting of a set of objects, or that itself is an object. But if we change this perception and instead view the atom not as an object but as an organism, then we can see, probably, the interaction between the proton and neutron.

If we just classify the proton as being electrically charged and the neutron as having no charge, that tells us nothing about their interaction because, after all, we do see a progressive change in mass in the proton and neutron as we go up the chemical elements. For example, the nucleus of helium has greater mass than hydrogen. This tells us that the interaction between proton and neutron is making a difference, differentiating the chemicals from each other.^2

Organicism views the atom as an organism whose behaviour constitutes a change in its physical composition. If we apply the quality of proton and neutron against each other and view them as internal relations belonging to the same entity, then we have the following demonstration: the proton has a positive electric charge, and so it determines to move in a certain direction, but the neutron, having no charge, maintains no determination, which, being itself a determination, becomes a negative in relation to the proton. So the proton aims to go a certain way, but the neutron tugs on the proton and stops it from fully going that way. This changes the determination of the proton, but since it is electrically charged, it now determines in a different way.

And this tug and pull between the proton and neutron, each maintaining their nature against each other, is conceived by the electron. The electron captures each both the proton and neutron make against each other and abstracts that into a distinct moment of an organism. This is a primal system of a Being generator.

Footnotes

1. The proton and neutron have very similar masses, but they are not exactly the same mass; the neutron is slightly more massive than the proton. The proton carries a positive electric charge, while the neutron has no net electric charge.
2. The nuclei of different elements have different masses as their numbers of protons and neutrons change. The difference in nuclear composition is what distinguishes one element from another, while the total nuclear mass reflects the number and binding of its constituent nucleons.

One scientific point worth flagging: The statement that the proton and neutron have “the same mass” is not strictly accurate—the neutron is slightly heavier than the proton.

Atom as a Logical Abstraction of Continuity

The atom is a logical abstraction taken from the nature of internal relations. The atom is not a static unit; it is an abstraction taken from continuous logical determinations. If we look at the nature of the atomic structures of each chemical compound, we see a continuous process whereby each atomic structure is the further logical determination of the previous. For example:

Figure: The progressive transitions of atomic structures

The atomic structures of chemical compounds culminate as a logical series where one atomic structure is the development of the other. If, for instance, we look at the nature of the hydrogen atom in relation to the helium atom, we see that they are logically related. They are only distinct in that they are different abstractions derived from the same continuous activity. Both atoms are logically connected in that one atom is the development of the other. For example:

Figure: The logical transition of the hydrogen atom into the helium atom

• = Proton, – = electron, o = neutron

(1) The “elementary electric charge” of an electron is negative [−1e], whereas the proton is positive [+1e].^1

(2) The positive proton in relation to the negative electron stabilizes in relation to each other and forms a neutrally charged neutron. Their interaction together results in a neutron with a [0e] elementary electric charge.^2

(3) The interaction between electron and proton produces a neutron outside the atomic nucleus, which, in that state, is very unstable and starts to decay. In nuclear physics, the concept “neutron beta decay” describes the transformation of a neutron into a proton, changing the nuclide type.^3

The decay of the neutron produces an additional proton. For example, Proton + neutron = proton. This is logically derived:

Neutron — down (−1/3), down (−1/3), up (2/3) = 0e

Proton — up (2/3), up (2/3), down (−1/3) = +1e

The two up quarks of the proton balance out with the two down of the neutron, leaving the inverse determination of one up and one down, which equals the following: −1/3 and 2/3 = 1/3.

1/3 = +1e of a proton

(4) The decay of the neutron transforms into a proton, which emits an electron because the nucleus is only stable with an electron. The electron is the negation that is presupposed by the positive. From the decay of the neutron, we have the addition of one new electron and proton to the already pre-existing electron and proton of hydrogen.^4

(5) Since now there are two protons in the nucleus, they presuppose each a neutron so as to be stable; otherwise, the positively charged nature of the proton will produce a strong repulsive force between the protons in the nucleus, therefore distorting the nucleus interactions. The interaction between proton and electron presupposes the neutron as their principle of opposition. The chemical compound helium is the more logically developed structure of hydrogen.^5

So far, it has been stated that logic takes on geometric form, and these geometric forms correspond to the determination of nature, such as space, time, and matter. Logical determinations form a continuity of development in nature, and this developmental process acquires quantitative mass and qualitative momentum. This is explicit from the atomic structures of chemical compounds fundamental for material substances.

It is next only appropriate to explain what is meant by continuity because that will explain how reason operates as the principle of development in the world. More specifically, Peirce’s notion of continuity can be appropriated to explain how the logical forms constitute a continuous series, accounting for how qualities develop quantitative properties.

Footnotes

1. The elementary electric charge is conventionally assigned as −1e for the electron and +1e for the proton. See Berkeley Lab, The Particle Adventure, discussion of elementary particles and electric charge.
2. A neutron has zero net electric charge. However, in standard particle physics, a neutron is not formed simply by the stabilization of a proton and electron; it is a composite particle consisting of three quarks (one up quark and two down quarks). The proton is likewise composed of two up quarks and one down quark.
3. In beta-minus decay, a free neutron transforms into a proton, an electron, and an electron antineutrino. The process changes the atomic number and therefore changes the nuclide into a different one.
4. The statement here follows the conceptual framework of the argument. In standard nuclear physics, however, an electron emitted during neutron beta decay is not emitted because the nucleus “is only stable with an electron.” The electron is produced as part of the beta-decay process.
5. Helium is not a chemical compound but a chemical element. A helium-4 nucleus contains two protons and two neutrons, while ordinary hydrogen-1 contains one proton and no neutrons. The addition of nuclear constituents therefore gives helium a greater atomic mass than hydrogen.

Atom and the Dialectical Process of Development

If we look at the nature of the atom, we see that each chemical constituent bears a more complex atomic number. The fact that certain chemicals bear a greater atomic number is not something by mistake. Each chemical compound is a development of the other. This is simply true just by looking at the atomic number of each; each is a continuation of the other.^1

The basic atom relation is that protons and neutrons are heavier than electrons and are centred and circled by the electron. Such properties of an atom are logical. The relation between the proton and the neutron is the relation of the non-contradiction and excluded middle, whereas the electron is the identity. This derives more complexity when the atomic structure becomes more complex. And the reason why the atomic structure becomes more complex is because the logic of reason is a dialectical process. The dialectic is the process for growth and development.

It is ordinarily understood as a thesis and an antithesis formulate a synthesis. This is a simplification and not an entirely accurate portrayal of it. The dialectic is less rigid than this abstraction of it and more dynamic. It is the discourse of reason—how thought takes its object and how the object is the expression of reason. It is the relationship between the universal and the particular. The particular is the object; the universal is thought. Thought abstracts its idea, and that idea contradicts thought as a complete entity, and thought has to reconcile its idea with all of its thinking.

So thought separates each of its ideas into individual moments and sees how each of those moments makes up the whole. This is a developmental process, an infinitesimal continuity, beginning with the very simple idea and advancing to the very complex. The separation of ideas is a progressive process starting with the basic and ending with the complex. It does not separate in the same way that we ordinarily take the word to mean. It does not dissect its thought; it rather engages in developing its thought. Thought does not exist as already something there to be received, like it is for us; it has to produce its thought by reasoning.

With each increase in proton and neutron, we see a greater increase in electron reaction. And with each increase, matter is developed.^2

Footnotes

1. Atomic number is defined by the number of protons in an atom’s nucleus. The chemical elements are therefore ordered by increasing atomic number, from hydrogen (1) upward. However, the elements are not ordinarily described in physics as each being a “development” of the preceding element; that is the philosophical interpretation being developed in this passage. Also, “chemical constituent” and “chemical compound” are not interchangeable terms: an element is defined by its atomic number, while a compound consists of two or more different elements chemically bonded together.
2. In standard atomic physics, increasing atomic number generally means an increase in the number of electrons in a neutral atom, because a neutral atom has equal numbers of protons and electrons. Neutrons also generally increase in number among heavier stable nuclei, although there is no simple one-to-one increase between protons, neutrons, and electrons. The resulting changes in electron configuration and nuclear structure account for increasingly complex atomic and chemical behaviour. The claim that this constitutes a dialectical development of matter is the philosophical interpretation advanced in the present argument.

Rational Development of the Atom

In the atom, the neutron and the proton are surrounded by electrons. The neutron has no charge, the proton has a positive charge, and the electrons have a negative charge.^1 The unity of the atom with itself seems to be the concept for the object. It is a concept, as everything is made up of the atom. The atoms formulate a result; they make up the object, yet they are actually a concept, as they make up an infinite number of different objects. Explicitly, it seems that the atom is the result, and modern science views it this way. The atom is seen as the result because it is the object. However, every object is its own concept, so the atom cannot be the concept.

The concept is the process the atom has with itself to become the object; the atom itself is the enduring object. Once there is the object, what is its concept? Every object has to have a new concept that results in further objects? Yes, but only for ONE object that is actually the concept. The object that is actually the concept is “self-conscious reason.” The atoms are the object for the latter concept. And the concept makes the object to be itself, the concept. What is reality? It is the Concept.

The atom is the result but is itself a process, between the proton, neutron, and electrons. Each object is a combination of atoms for a result. The atoms are in a process with themselves. Each process itself is a result. Is every result the same? No, every result is formulated by the atoms in a different way; some things in nature are more complex than others. The difference in complexity asserts a qualitative difference between each atom that is the process. The highest formulated atoms is self-conscious being; the human being is the set of atoms that are conscious of themselves. In the empirical sense, the human being is the highest complex formulation of atoms. For each object to be itself, it has already gone through a process of being everything else except itself. This is a result in itself; however, it is a result in the process. Everything already is, but for what? The latter is the process of the result. Self-conscious beings are in the process for the result in itself.

Complex Atomic Number

If we look at the nature of the atom, we see that each chemical constituent bears a more complex atomic number. The fact that certain chemicals bear a greater atomic number is not merely quantitative. Each chemical compound is a development of the other. This is simply true just by looking at the atomic number of each; each is a continuation of the other.^2

The basic atom relation is that protons and neutrons are heavier than electrons and are centred and circled by the electron. Such properties of an atom are logical. The relation between the proton and the neutron is the relation of the non-contradiction and excluded middle, whereas the electron is the identity. This derives more complexity when the atomic structure becomes more complex. And the reason why the atomic structure becomes more complex is because the logic of reason is a dialectical process. The dialectic is the process for growth and development. It is ordinarily understood as a thesis and an antithesis formulate a synthesis. This is a simplification and not an entirely accurate portrayal of it. The dialectic is less rigid than this abstraction of it and more dynamic. It is the discourse of reason—how thought takes its object and how the object is the expression of reason. It is the relationship between the universal and the particular.

The particular is the object; the universal is thought. Thought abstracts its idea, and that idea contradicts thought as a complete entity, and thought has to reconcile its idea with all of its thinking. So thought separates each of its ideas into individual moments and sees how each of those moments makes up the whole. This is a developmental process, an infinitesimal continuity, beginning with the very simple idea and advancing to the very complex. The separation of ideas is a progressive process starting with the basic and ending with the complex. It does not separate in the same way that we ordinarily take the word to mean. It does not dissect its thought; it rather engages in developing its thought. Thought does not exist as already something there to be received, like it is for us; it has to produce its thought by reasoning.

With each increase in proton and neutron, we see a greater increase in electron reaction. And with each increase, matter is developed.

Each atomic structure associated with the chemical compound is a dialectical sublation of the previous. This means that the next chemical is the logical resolution of the previous. The movement of this dialectical process is based on the laws of thought. Take, for example, the very basic chemical hydrogen, which is most abundant in the world.^3 Why is it most abundant? This is due to its logical structure. Hydrogen is colourless, tasteless, etc., but highly flammable and can come in every form, such as gaseous, liquid, slush, metallic, and solid.^4 This is the case because hydrogen is indefinite in logical form insofar as it consists of a positively charged proton in relation to a negatively charged electron with no neutral neutrons.^5 This means that it is highly unstable and therefore bears not an exact form in the same way as the following chemicals. However, given the logical nature of hydrogen, its unstable nature still produces a stable result.

Footnotes

1. A neutral atom contains a positively charged nucleus composed of protons and, except for ordinary hydrogen-1, neutrons, surrounded by electrons. The proton has a positive elementary charge, the electron has a negative elementary charge, and the neutron has no net electric charge. The wording here is retained as part of the philosophical argument, although electron “orbits” should not be understood literally in modern quantum mechanics.
2. Atomic number is determined by the number of protons in an atom’s nucleus. Thus, the elements are arranged in a sequence of increasing atomic number. This provides the scientific basis for the observation that hydrogen (atomic number 1), helium (2), lithium (3), and so forth form a numerical sequence. The claim that each chemical is therefore a “development” or “continuation” of the previous chemical is a philosophical interpretation rather than the standard scientific description of the periodic table.
3. Hydrogen is the most abundant element in the universe by mass and is the most abundant ordinary element in the universe. Its abundance is principally explained by cosmological and astrophysical processes, particularly primordial nucleosynthesis and the composition of the early universe, rather than by its logical structure in the conventional scientific account.
4. Hydrogen can exist in gaseous, liquid, and solid phases under appropriate temperature and pressure conditions. Metallic hydrogen is a predicted or experimentally investigated high-pressure phase, rather than an ordinary form of hydrogen encountered under everyday conditions. “Slush” can refer to a mixture of solid and liquid phases under appropriate conditions.
5. The most common isotope of hydrogen, protium (hydrogen-1), contains one proton and one electron and no neutron. Other hydrogen isotopes, such as deuterium and tritium, contain one or two neutrons respectively. The absence of a neutron in ordinary hydrogen does not, by itself, make hydrogen “highly unstable”: a neutral hydrogen atom is stable. Hydrogen gas is highly flammable because of its chemical properties and its reaction with oxygen, not because the atom lacks a neutron.
6. The term “sublation” is used here in its philosophical sense associated with dialectical development, particularly in Hegel, where a determination is simultaneously negated, preserved, and elevated into a further determination. The application of this concept to atomic and chemical development is the philosophical framework of the present argument rather than a standard scientific account of atomic structure.

Hydrogen

• The positive proton in relation to the negative electron stabilizes each other and forms a neutral neutron.^1
• This neutral neutron is indefinite and can act both as positive and negative.
• The electron in relation to the neutron is only left to see itself and so duplicates into another electron.
• The new extra electron now negates the proton, forming another new neutron.
• The neutron now is left with the proton, which then the proton sees itself in the neutron and produces an additional proton.

This is the step-to-step process:

This logical process of hydrogen results in the new and stable atomic form as such:

This atomic number structure is precisely the structure for helium. Helium has heavier properties than hydrogen, and so it takes on stable properties of thermal conductivity, specific heat, and plasma structure.^2

Atom Is the Physical Law of Thought

The atom consists of a nucleus with an electron bound to the nucleus. The nucleus is composed of protons and sometimes neutrons. The formulation of the atom as a constituent of a nucleus with an electron tells us nothing about the nature of the atomic activity. The terms proton, neutron, and electron are useful abstractions hinting at moments that constitute an active process. The atom is the moment where time and space meet. (see Hegel space and time.)

An atomic nucleus is basically an equilibrium between two opposing forces. There are two types of electric charges: positive and negative. The general rule is that like charges repel and unlike charges attract. The positive in relation to the negative refers to electric charges because electricity is raw energy. Electromagnetism is only the physical property of force, but what is force as a property of motion? The positive force is usually understood as an outwards motion, which is why it is an activity of repulsion, because it is already coming from a place of identity or attraction. The negative is an inward motion because it is coming from a place of repulsion or difference, and coming together in unity.

The positive force is associated with the proton, which, according to the Greeks, means “first.”^4 The proton is composed of three quarks. Protons are made up of two Up (u) and one Down (D).^5 The U is the lightest form of energy and the D is the heavier. We can say that the U is the outwards motion and the D is the inwards. These opposing motions result in an equilibrium. But how is this equilibrium achieved when there are unequal quarks?

The proton is the force of division, and it is defined by the nature of Deduction. Deduction for Peirce is the general law that divides into particular instances. The two U in the proton are the principle of identity, that P = P is first necessary. And because P identifies with itself, it reflects itself. The one Down is the negation—the law of non-contradiction, P or not-P. The identity of U + U is negated by D as not-U; both resolve by the excluded middle, that D as not-U is some other force external from the contradiction. This force is the electron.

The identity of P = P, which in this case is U + U, because what is identical with itself equally reflects itself, in that 1 must first be equal to 1 before it is added to 1: 1 = 1 before 1 + 1. The identity of P is the inversion of Not-P, which is the D quark, which is the negation of P. So if P = P internally, the negation is P = not-P externally. This is why the atom looks like this:

Since P is the identity, D is the negation, and so it is not-P, and so it is nothing else but the inverse of P. This inversion is the opposite unity of P = P or U + U. The reason why there is only one D quark in the proton is because the one D is the internal negation, but there is also an external negation, because the law of non-contradiction is the inverse relation to P = P. If P is internally with P, the inverse relation would be P external from not-P.

The electron does not have quarks because it is negation. The electron is the inverse negation of P. If P is the U U, the not-P is the inverse, so D and the external force of the electron. This inverse process of the proton produces the neutron, which has no electric charge and a higher mass.^6 The reason why neutrons do not have an electric charge is because the neutron is defined by induction. The neutrons are the individual variable expression of the proton. The neutron is the antithesis for the proton. Whatever the proton is, the neutron is the fixed abstraction of that.

Footnotes

The neutron has no net electric charge because its quark charges sum to zero: one up quark (+2/3e) and two down quarks (−1/3e each). Its rest mass is slightly greater than that of the proton.

In standard physics, a proton and electron do not stabilize each other and form a neutron. A neutron is a composite particle consisting of one up quark and two down quarks. A proton consists of two up quarks and one down quark. The transformation of a proton and electron into a neutron can occur under particular physical conditions through electron capture, but it is not the ordinary formation of a neutron from hydrogen.

Helium has a greater atomic mass than hydrogen and has different physical properties, including different thermal conductivity, specific heat, and behaviour as a plasma. These properties are understood in modern physics through helium’s atomic structure and its interactions, rather than as consequences of the logical process described here.

A neutral atom has a positively charged nucleus surrounded by negatively charged electrons. The nucleus contains protons and, except in ordinary hydrogen-1, neutrons. The neutron has no net electric charge, while the proton has a positive elementary charge and the electron has a negative elementary charge.

The word “proton” derives from the Greek prōton, meaning “first.” The modern scientific concept of the proton, however, is distinct from the ancient Greek philosophical concept of the “first.”

In the Standard Model, a proton consists of two up quarks and one down quark. The up quark has electric charge +2/3e, while the down quark has electric charge −1/3e, giving the proton a total charge of +1e. The description of U as “the lightest form of energy” and D as “the heavier” is not standard particle-physics terminology.

‘Alike with Alike’ Inverse Forces of the Observer

The idea that “alike goes with alike” seems, at first, to contradict the electromagnetic variations that appear to operate according to the inverse of this logic, in the sense that opposites actually attract while like charges repel. Yet this contradiction may only appear to exist if we understand “alike” and “opposite” as referring to the same level of substance or the same dimensional magnitude. Electric or electromagnetic forces actually start from a position of inverse: they are already constituted through the relation of the negative and the positive, the attraction and the repulsion, the opposing poles that establish the field between them.[^1] The positive, in terms of light, photon, and the density of mass and matter into perceptible objects, gives rise to objects that exhibit an internal cohesion which, outwardly, exhibits a homogeneous conception for an observer. The identity of the object observed is whole. Yet the forces within it are inverse, while the forces external to it, forming its whole identity, are alike in nature.[^2] Therefore, “alike produces alike” does not necessarily mean that identical physical forces must attract one another. Rather, it may mean that substances of the same kind give rise to forms of the same kind, even when the internal relations that constitute those forms are inverse.

In this sense, an object can contain internal oppositions without ceasing to be a whole. The inverse forces within the object are precisely what establish its internal relation, while the object as a whole presents itself to the observer as one homogeneous identity. What appears externally as a single object may therefore contain within itself a multiplicity of inverse relations. The whole is not negated by the opposition of its parts; rather, the opposition of its parts is what allows the whole to appear as a determinate form.[^3] The forces internal to the object can therefore be inverse, while the relation between the object and another object may be alike in the more fundamental sense that both are forms generated from the same kind of substance. The distinction is therefore not simply between attraction and repulsion, but between different levels at which likeness and opposition are being described.

Therefore, alike produces alike not in terms of physicality, or what we see as external objects acting from an outside of the observer, but rather in substance, abstract reason, and form. The form of these objects is abstract and rational; they are, in a potential state, capable of becoming determinate objects for an observer.[^4] In this sense, “alike objects give rise to alike,” or, as the ancients analogized it, “man begets man.”[^5] The principle is that substance of the same kind gives rise to the same substance: matter gives rise to matter, and mind to mind. The physical expression of this principle may contain inverse forces, opposing charges, and internal tensions, but the underlying substance remains of the same kind. The inverse is therefore not necessarily the opposite of the same substance; rather, it can be the relation through which the same substance becomes determinate.

This also allows us to reconsider the relationship between matter and mind. Matter and mind may initially appear to be substances of different kinds, because matter is presented to us as physical, measurable, extended, and perceptible, while mind is presented through conception, observation, abstraction, and rational form. Yet they intersect in the observer. They intersect to produce the conception for the observer, where the observer is a middle point of inverse between the two. The observer is therefore not merely positioned quantitatively between matter and mind, as though it were simply another object located somewhere between two other objects in physical space. Rather, the observer occupies a middle point in dimensional magnitude, where the physical and the abstract are brought into relation.[^6]

The observer consequently becomes significant because the observer is where these two modes are disclosed together. Matter is encountered as an object, while mind is the condition through which that object becomes an object of conception. The physical object is therefore not simply “outside” the observer, because its identity as an observed object is completed through the relation between what exists physically and the mind that conceives it. At the same time, mind cannot simply be reduced to the physical object, because the conception of the object involves an activity that is not identical to the object’s physical extension. The observer is thus a point of inverse relation: matter is disclosed as the external form, while mind is disclosed as the internal activity of conception.

From this perspective, the principle that “alike goes with alike” can be reformulated. It does not necessarily mean that physically identical things attract one another. Instead, it means that a substance gives rise to forms according to its own kind. Matter gives rise to material forms; mind gives rise to conceptual forms; and where matter and mind intersect within observation, the physical form becomes a conceived object. The inverse relations within matter do not destroy this principle because the inverse is already part of the way the whole is constituted. Opposites may attract within the physical structure, while likeness operates at the level of the substance and form of the whole. What appears as contradiction is therefore a difference between levels of description: attraction and repulsion describe relations within a physical field, whereas “alike produces alike” describes a more fundamental relation of substance, form, and intelligibility.

The object, then, is not merely a lifeless piece of matter existing independently of all relation. It is a whole identity disclosed through a complex arrangement of internal inverse forces and external relations of likeness. The observer sees the whole because the observer does not directly perceive every inverse relation constituting the object; instead, those relations are synthesized into a single identity. The object therefore appears homogeneous to the observer even though its internal constitution may be heterogeneous, inverse, and relational. This is where the physical and the abstract begin to intersect: the physical object supplies the determinate form, while mind supplies the conception through which that form is recognized as one thing. The observer becomes the middle point through which these different modes of substance are reconciled—not because they become identical, but because they become intelligible within the same phenomenon.[^7]

Footnotes

[^1]: In electromagnetism, the statement that “opposites attract” applies specifically to electric charges: opposite charges exert attractive forces, while like charges repel. This should not be generalized to all electromagnetic phenomena, where the relationships among electric fields, magnetic fields, currents, photons, and matter are considerably more complex.

[^2]: The distinction between an object’s internal forces and its outward identity is a metaphysical interpretation. Physics does support the idea that stable physical structures can arise from interacting forces and fields, but it does not by itself establish the stronger claim that external objects are “alike in substance.”

[^3]: This idea has affinities with philosophical traditions in which opposition or difference is understood as constitutive of unity. However, the argument here should be distinguished from any particular historical system unless we intend to develop a specific connection to Heraclitus, Hegel, Aristotle, or another philosopher.

[^4]: “Abstract and rational” here refers to our metaphysical conception of form rather than to the mathematical formalism of contemporary physics. The claim that physical objects exist in a “potential state” also has an important philosophical resonance with Aristotle’s distinction between potentiality and actuality, although your use of the concept differs from Aristotle’s.

[^5]: The phrase “man begets man” is associated with ancient discussions of generation, especially Aristotle’s formulation that human beings are generated by human beings. In Aristotle, this is connected to biological generation and the transmission of form, rather than directly to the atomist principle of atoms.

[^6]: “Dimensional magnitude” is being used here in your philosophical sense rather than in the strict mathematical sense of spatial dimensions or physical dimensional analysis. The intended distinction appears to be between quantitative position and a qualitative or ontological position between different modes of being.

[^7]: The final argument approaches a form of metaphysical or phenomenological idealism: the physical thing may exist independently of an individual observer, but its status as an observed object involves a relation to consciousness. This distinction is important because it prevents the argument from immediately claiming that individual human consciousness literally creates physical matter.

Proton

The proton is the force of division and it is defined by the nature of deduction. Deduction, for Peirce, is the general law that divides into particular instances. The proton therefore represents the first determination of the atom because it is the positive determination of identity. The very name “proton” comes from the Greek protos, meaning “first.”^1

The proton is composed of three quarks: two Up (u) quarks and one Down (d) quark. The two U quarks can be understood within the logic of identity, while the one D quark represents the negation of that identity. The U is the lighter form of energy, while the D is heavier. We can say that the U is the outwards motion and the D is the inwards motion. These opposing motions result in an equilibrium.^2

But how is this equilibrium achieved when there is an unequal number of quarks? The two U quarks in the proton are the principle of identity, that P = P is first necessary. Because P identifies with itself, it reflects itself. The one Down quark is the negation—the law of non-contradiction, P or not-P. The identity of U + U is negated by D as not-U. Both resolve by the excluded middle, that D as not-U is some other force external from the contradiction. This force is the electron.

The identity of P = P, which in this case is U + U, means that what is identical with itself equally reflects itself, in that 1 must first be equal to 1 before it is added to 1: 1 = 1 before 1 + 1. The identity of P is the inversion of not-P, which is the D quark, which is the negation of P. So if P = P internally, the negation is P = not-P externally.

Since P is the identity, D is the negation, and so it is not-P, and so it is nothing else but the inverse of P. This inversion is the opposite unity of P = P, or U + U. The reason why there is only one D quark in the proton is because the one D is the internal negation, but there is also an external negation, because the law of non-contradiction is the inverse relation to P = P. If P is internally with P, the inverse relation would be P external from not-P.

The electron does not have quarks because it is negation. The electron is the inverse negation of P. If P is the U + U, the not-P is the inverse, so D and the external force of the electron. The electron therefore represents the external determination of the negation that is already internally contained within the proton. The proton is therefore not simply a positive object; it is an internal unity that contains its own negation and thereby establishes the possibility of an external relation.

Neutron

This inverse process of the proton produces the neutron, which has no electric charge and a higher mass.^3 The neutron is the determination that results when the internal opposition of the proton becomes an external unity. The proton contains the positive determination of identity, while the D quark provides its internal negation. The neutron takes this opposition and produces a determination in which the positive and negative charges resolve into a neutral relation.

The reason why neutrons do not have an electric charge is because the neutron is defined by induction. The neutrons are the individual variable expression of the proton. The neutron is the antithesis for the proton. Whatever the proton is, the neutron is the fixed abstraction of that.

The proton therefore begins from the universal determination of identity, while the neutron is the individual determination that results from that identity being placed into relation with its negation. The proton is P = P; the neutron is the determination of P in relation to not-P. The neutron does not simply stand outside the proton as another object. It is the result of the proton’s own internal relation becoming a further determination.

The proton is therefore the positive determination, while the neutron is the negative or opposing determination that preserves the relation without remaining electrically positive. The neutron has no net electric charge because its internal quark configuration consists of one Up quark and two Down quarks: the positive charge of the Up quark is balanced by the two negatively charged Down quarks.^4 In this sense, the neutron is the fixed abstraction of the opposition contained within the proton.

The relation between proton and neutron therefore gives us the internal activity of the nucleus. The proton is the determination of identity; the neutron is the determination of difference and opposition. Their relation is not merely the relation between two separate objects but the relation of determinations within the same atomic process. The nucleus is therefore an equilibrium in which the positive determination of the proton and the neutral determination of the neutron maintain a relation through the forces acting between them.

The electron then appears as the external negation of this relation. It is not composed of quarks because, according to the Standard Model, the electron is an elementary lepton rather than a composite particle.^5 The electron is therefore the external determination that completes the relation of the proton and neutron. What is internally divided within the proton becomes externally related through the electron and neutron.

Thus, the proton, neutron, and electron are not three unrelated objects. They are three determinations of the same atomic process. The proton is the positive identity; the neutron is the neutral determination of opposition; and the electron is the external negation. Their relation constitutes the atom as an active process rather than a static object.

Footnotes

1. The word “proton” derives from the Greek prōton, meaning “first.” In modern physics, the proton is a positively charged composite particle found in atomic nuclei.
2. In the Standard Model, a proton consists of two up quarks and one down quark. The up quark has electric charge +2/3e and the down quark has electric charge −1/3e, giving the proton a total charge of +1e.
3. The neutron is electrically neutral and has a slightly greater rest mass than the proton. A neutron consists of one up quark and two down quarks, giving a total electric charge of +2/3e − 1/3e − 1/3e = 0.
4. The quark description provides the physical basis for the charge relation: the proton’s two up quarks and one down quark give +1e, while the neutron’s one up quark and two down quarks give 0e. The philosophical interpretation of these configurations as “identity,” “negation,” “opposition,” “deduction,” and “induction” is the conceptual framework of the present argument rather than the terminology of particle physics.
5. The electron is an elementary lepton in the Standard Model and is not known to contain smaller constituent particles. It therefore has no known quark substructure. Its electric charge is −1e.

Atom as a Dynamic Organism of Development

The entire purpose of this section is to move away from seeing the atom as just a unit of measure, a segment of a fundamental component of matter that is divisible into parts. These characterizations are true for the understanding, to catalogue a fundamental observable aspect of matter, but matter, as generally spoken, does not mean much; for both a horse and the atoms that make it up are labeled as matter, yet they are very different fundamental experiences in reality. Therefore, reality is not ultimately measurable only in terms of matter, but that element is only its perceivable aspect. It is, moreover, measurable as qualities, which are fundamentally thoughts for experiences of an observer.

The observer experiences the world by his mind, and his mind creates thoughts which correlate to fundamental elements outside himself.^1 The atom is therefore a dynamic organism of development. It develops evolutionary through spacetime, and it creates the environment we take to be organic. The results are these organic environments that sustain life. Generally, these are results from a development process. If you gather each atom alongside each other into a series or a sequence, you see the gradual progressive development in structure. The complexity grows like a flowering coming out of a seed, from simplicity to complexity. From simplicity to complexity is the keynote of natural development.^2

Footnotes

1. The distinction between an observer’s experience of the world and the physical description of the world is important to the argument. In modern physics, an observation involves a physical interaction between a measuring system and the system being measured. The claim that qualities are “fundamentally thoughts for experiences of an observer” is a philosophical interpretation of this relation rather than a claim established by physics alone.
2. In chemistry, the elements can be arranged according to increasing atomic number, with each element distinguished by the number of protons in its nucleus. This produces an ordered sequence of increasing atomic number, while increasing nuclear and electronic complexity accompanies the progression toward heavier elements. The interpretation of this sequence as a developmental movement “from simplicity to complexity” is the philosophical claim being developed here.

Leucippus and the Void as the Possibility of Mind

The central argument makes the transition from ancient atomism to speculative interpretation of the void clearer. We will be distinguishing what is historically attributable to Leucippus/Democritus from our own philosophical proposal. Leucippus was a fifth-century BCE Greek philosopher traditionally credited with developing, together with , the first systematic form of Greek atomism. Ancient atomism proposed two fundamental principles of reality: indivisible bodies, or atoms, and the void in which those atoms move.[^1] The void is especially important because it raises a philosophical problem that the ancient atomists themselves did not fully resolve and that later criticized. If the void is genuinely empty—devoid of qualities, purposes, or determining principles—then it appears to be merely a passive absence that provides space for atoms to move but does not explain why they move or why they should come together in particular configurations. The atoms themselves possess different shapes, sizes, and arrangements, and the atomists appealed to necessity, collision, motion, and, in some accounts, the tendency of like to associate with like to explain the formation of structures.[^2] Yet this explanation seems to leave a deeper question unanswered: why does motion occur in the first place, and why does the resulting motion produce stable, intelligible, and apparently rational structures rather than merely arbitrary combinations?

To say that the atoms combine “by necessity” may describe the inevitability of an event within the system, but it does not necessarily explain the reason or principle according to which that event occurs. This is close to Aristotle’s broader objection to explanations that appeal only to material and mechanical causes while failing to account for the end or intelligible principle toward which a process is directed.[^3] From this perspective, the ancient notion of void becomes philosophically ambiguous. The void is said to lack qualities, yet it performs an indispensable function: without it, atoms could not move, interact, separate, collide, or form the structures that constitute the observable world. In this sense, the void appears to be “nothing,” while simultaneously providing the condition of possibility for something. One may therefore speculate that the void’s apparent lack of qualities does not necessarily prove that it is metaphysically empty; rather, its emptiness might indicate that its true nature is not directly represented as one particular quality among other qualities.

The void could instead be understood as a field of possibilities within which determinate structures become actual. On such an interpretation, the void would no longer be conceived merely as an inert container or passive absence, but analogically as something resembling a field of mind: a rational or intelligible space of possibilities in which distinct forms can arise, relate to one another, and become organized into coherent structures. This would offer a speculative response to the problem left unresolved by mechanical atomism. If atoms alone are insufficient to explain why their combinations exhibit order, intelligibility, or rational structure, perhaps the “void” must be reconsidered as more than simple non-being. The void could represent the condition through which possibility itself becomes structured—a field in which relations between otherwise independent elements become intelligible. In this sense, what appears to the atomist as empty space may, from another metaphysical perspective, be the very condition that makes order possible. The ancient atomists therefore provide an important starting point for a deeper question: whether the apparent emptiness of the void is truly an absence of being, or whether it conceals a more fundamental principle of possibility, intelligibility, and perhaps even rationality.

Footnotes

[^1]: The attribution of atomism to Leucippus is ancient but historically difficult to establish in detail because virtually none of his writings survive. The principal surviving evidence comes through later authors, especially Aristotle and . Ancient atomism generally posited atoms and void as fundamental realities.

[^2]: Democritean atomism explains physical events primarily through the motion, shape, arrangement, and collision of atoms rather than through Aristotelian final causes. The formula “like attracts like” should therefore be used cautiously: it does not straightforwardly capture the whole of ancient atomist physics.

[^3]: Aristotle’s criticism of atomism is part of his broader critique of explanations that reduce natural processes to necessity, matter, motion, and mechanical interaction without adequately accounting for formal and final causes. See Aristotle, Physics I–II and IV, especially his discussions of the causes of natural things and the arguments concerning the void.

A key distinction strengthens our argument: the claim that the void is actually a quality of mind is not a doctrine of Leucippus or Democritus. It is a metaphysical development you are proposing from the problems internal to atomism. That distinction is important because it lets us say, in effect: ancient atomism discovers a problem—the void seems to be nothing, yet it makes something possible—and we are proposing that this problem points toward a different conception of the void as a field of possibility or intelligibility.

Leucippus, the Void in the Particle, and the Event

According to Aristotle, Leucippus is a fifth-century BCE philosopher credited with developing Greek ancient atomism and introducing the dual principles of atoms and void.[^1] The possible notion here is that the void is not simply this empty void of lack of quality. In the notion of void that the ancient atomist could not fully resolve, according to , the void is the area whereby atoms interact and form structures; yet, being a wholly passive field, the void itself provides no apparent reason that compels these atoms to come together to form rational structures.[^2] The atomists can appeal to the motion, shape, arrangement, and collision of atoms, and one may speak of the tendency of like to come together with like, but again there remains the question: what is the real cause that brings them together? The answer that the ancient atomist provides is that it occurs out of necessity; there is no other reason other than the fact that it is necessary.[^3] But this answer still appears to be lacking, because necessity itself seems to have to have an aim or final-end reason as to why it is the cause of the action or movement. Therefore, the notion that the void lacks qualities, yet provides the conditions that allow these atoms to form together into rational structures, raises the possibility that the void, while appearing wholly passive, may only appear this way because its true nature is not directly disclosed. The void could actually be the quality of a mind, a rational observer whose mind is the field of possibilities where these structures come together. On this interpretation, the apparent emptiness of the void would not necessarily mean that it is nothing; rather, its “emptiness” could be precisely what allows possibilities to be disclosed and relations between things to emerge.[^4]

The idea of an event particle ultimately combines the physical measure of the subatomic basic structure of matter into discrete units of matter or energy called particles, and ultimately atoms.[^5] Yet matter, as a measure of energy, means that matter is not this stable, static, solid piece of concrete content that we observe and feel with our senses. This depiction of matter is constructed by our senses, or at least disclosed to us through the particular manner in which our senses encounter physical reality.[^6] At the same time, matter is not this wholly hollow substance as we might see through abstract thought. Matter still holds you up, but only because you are also of the same substance and kind as matter: matter holds matter. But what if the substances are of a different kind? How do we reconcile those substances of different kinds? Ultimately, this is what we are dealing with in our idea of the event combined with the particle. An event seems to be beyond a purely physical characterization because an event is an activity—something that occurs or happens to physical things. Yet physical things are disclosed within events, so to speak; they are themselves events for mind and observer.[^7] Within the same occurrence, therefore, we may be witnessing two different modes of substance: the physical substance disclosed as matter and the event as the occurrence or activity through which that matter is disclosed.

A particle, meanwhile, is a discrete unit of energy, and therefore the notions of particle and event are not necessarily as contradictory as they first appear. They are contradictory only within our characterization of them.

A discrete measure of energy as the basis of solid matter is one kind of substance, while events, as abstract occurrences for observers, are the activities of matter. Yet they are reconciled within the same phenomenon. A discrete unit of energy ultimately flickers in and out of existence, and its existence is simultaneous with its non-existence.[^8] This describes, in a speculative sense, the physical phenomenon of how events happen: events are disclosed through packets of energy; they change scenes like a movie on a screen or like a succession of snapshots, yet we experience the world as continuous and flowing as one.[^9] What appears to us as a continuous world may therefore be constituted by discrete objects of energy, with each object enclosed and contained within a unit of form. These are not merely “objects,” for the word makes them seem like lifeless matter. Objects are just the form—the appearances—of what we are describing as events disclosed as facets of discrete energy. The object, in this sense, is not something fundamentally separate from the event; rather, the object is the stable appearance or form through which an event becomes intelligible to the observer. What we call matter may therefore be understood as the discrete form of an event, while what we call an event may be understood as the activity through which discrete forms of energy become disclosed. The particle and the event are consequently not two entirely separate realities, but two descriptions of the same phenomenon from different modes of observation: one emphasizing discrete physical form and the other emphasizing occurrence, activity, relation, and disclosure.

This returns us to the original question of the void. If the void is conceived merely as empty space, it remains difficult to explain how something wholly passive could provide the conditions for the emergence of ordered structures. But if the void is understood as a field of possibilities—a field that is analogous to, or perhaps constituted by, mind—then the apparent passivity of the void may be reconsidered. The void would not be an empty nothing behind matter; it would be the condition through which matter and events can appear as determinate possibilities. The particle would be the discrete manifestation, while the event would be the occurrence through which that manifestation becomes actual or disclosed. In this way, the ancient problem of atoms and void becomes connected to a larger metaphysical problem: how can discrete physical structures, events, energy, matter, and the observing mind belong to the same phenomenon without reducing one entirely to the other? The possible answer is that what we call an “object” is simply the form that an event takes when disclosed within a field of possibilities, and that the field we call void may not be an absence of reality at all, but the condition through which reality is capable of taking form.

Footnotes

[^1]: Leucippus is traditionally regarded as a founder of Greek atomism, although the historical evidence about his life and writings is extremely limited. Ancient atomism is generally associated with the two fundamental principles of atoms and void. See Aristotle, Physics IV and On Generation and Corruption I.

[^2]: Aristotle’s criticism of the atomist conception of void is more complicated than the claim that the void simply “does nothing.” Aristotle argues against the existence of void because he considers it unnecessary and problematic for explaining motion. The formulation here develops your philosophical interpretation of that problem rather than presenting it as a direct quotation of Aristotle.

[^3]: Ancient atomism frequently explains physical processes through necessity, mechanical interaction, and the intrinsic properties and motions of atoms. However, the stronger claim that necessity itself must possess a final end moves beyond atomism and toward the Aristotelian problem of causes, particularly the distinction between material, efficient, formal, and final causes. See Aristotle, Physics II.3.

[^4]: The proposal that the void could be “the quality of a mind” or a rational observer is a speculative metaphysical extension of the atomist problem, not a doctrine attributed to Leucippus or Democritus. It also raises comparisons with later idealist and phenomenological traditions, although it should not be identified with any one of them without further argument.

[^5]: Here “particle” is being used philosophically rather than as a strict historical or contemporary physics definition. Modern physics does not simply equate particles with atoms: atoms are composite systems containing nuclei and electrons, while many particles are not atoms and some fundamental particles are not composed of smaller known constituents.

[^6]: The claim that our depiction of matter is constructed or disclosed by the senses has parallels with phenomenological philosophy, especially the distinction between an independently existing physical reality and the manner in which that reality is given to consciousness. This should therefore be understood as a philosophical claim rather than as a direct conclusion of physics.

[^7]: The statement that physical things “are themselves events for mind and observer” is central to the proposed event ontology. An event is not merely another physical object; it is an occurrence, process, or happening. The argument here is that objects may be understood as relatively stable forms disclosed within events rather than as absolutely static entities existing independently of all processes.

[^8]: The language of a particle “flickering in and out of existence” should be treated cautiously. In quantum field theory, particles are not generally understood literally as tiny objects repeatedly appearing from absolute nothingness and disappearing into absolute nothingness. The philosophical language here is attempting to capture the non-classical character of quantum phenomena, particularly the distinction between classical objects and quantum states, excitations, and interactions.

[^9]: The “movie” or “snapshot” analogy is a philosophical analogy rather than a literal description of how quantum mechanics works. Contemporary physics does not establish that reality is literally composed of successive still frames. The analogy is useful here because it expresses the proposed distinction between discrete physical manifestations and the continuous experience of events.

The Void as the Substance of Mind

The content that fills this void with quality, or, equally, to say the same thing, the quality of this void, is not a passive, empty field whereby atoms randomly or arbitrarily interact according to necessity for some unknown reason. Rather, the quality of this void—the lack of quality, the black field whereby light enters but does not escape—is because this is actually the substance of mind.[^1] For mind can only observe, but it cannot observe itself; it cannot observe the position from where it is making the observation. This seems to extend to observers having a lack of observation of the fundamental field of the observer: that also, a particular observer somehow interacts in the same quality that the universal substance of observer portrays objectively. It lacks perceptible quality, yet it derives qualities and generates them through conception.[^2] But how does mind create this conception? We can only refer to self-evidence: it is self-evident, logically and physically, that it creates its form from its own self-substance, that its substance is itself.[^3] In this sense, the void is not empty because it lacks content; rather, it is empty of perceptible qualities precisely because it is the fundamental field from which qualities can be conceived and disclosed. The observer cannot step outside of this field in order to observe it objectively, because the observer itself is contained within, and constituted through, the very substance that makes observation possible. Thus, what appears objectively as a void may, from the perspective of mind, be the absence of an observable object because the observing substance cannot become an object to itself in the same manner that other things can. The void therefore appears as a lack, but this lack may only be a lack of self-observation. What is absent from perception is not necessarily absent from being. The quality of the void may consequently be the quality of mind itself: a field without perceptible form that nevertheless generates form through conception, distinction, relation, and observation. The particular observer would then not be fundamentally separate from this universal substance of observer, but would participate in the same quality by which the universal field becomes capable of producing objective qualities. Mind, in this sense, does not receive all of its form from something wholly external to itself; rather, it produces form through its own self-substance. The conception is therefore not something added to mind from outside, but an activity of the substance of mind itself. What we call an object would then be a quality disclosed within this field, while the field itself remains without a perceptible quality because it is the condition through which qualities become perceptible. The void and mind would therefore describe the same fundamental condition from two different perspectives: the void as it appears objectively, and mind as it is experienced subjectively. What appears as empty space from the outside may therefore be the very substance that, from within, is capable of conception, observation, and the generation of form.

Footnotes

[^1]: This is a speculative metaphysical interpretation of the void and should not be attributed to Leucippus, Democritus, or ancient atomism itself. The image of a “black field whereby light enters but does not escape” also differs from the ancient philosophical meaning of void and should be understood here as an analogy for an unobservable or non-objectifiable field.

[^2]: The claim that mind “cannot observe itself” has an important philosophical precedent in the problem of reflexive consciousness. An observer can become conscious of its own thoughts or states, but the argument here is stronger: the observing standpoint itself cannot be turned into an ordinary object without establishing another standpoint from which to observe it. This resembles, in a broad sense, problems discussed in transcendental philosophy and phenomenology.

[^3]: The phrase “self-evident, logically and physically” is doing substantial philosophical work here. Logically, the argument suggests that the activity of conception demonstrates something about the nature of the conceiving subject. Physically, however, the claim that mind creates form “from its own self-substance” is not established by contemporary physics and therefore should be presented as a metaphysical hypothesis rather than an empirical conclusion.

last updated 12.09.2026