Section 27. (First updated 1.22.2021)
Physical Motion
The concepts on the one hand belong to the minds of the scientist that produced their discoveries, yet such cannot be accredited as ‘being’ made by their scientist because they belong as fundamental depictions of nature that exists universally, that is; if any mind would rationally conceive them, they would be conceived in the same way. In order for a conception be a considered a “discovery”, the concept the idea depicts must exists ‘universally’ and then grasped ‘particularly’. Exists in the same way always, and be grasped by something different than itself.
Kant talks about how the “idea” for Plato is something in nature (from 12:43- 13:35)
The development of quantum science has revealed principles more fundamental than those that counterpane the general and special theories of relativity.
Quantum mechanics does NOT contradict theories of “relativity” in the sense of excluding them, but rather offers an account of the fundamental realm that is inaccessible to the kind of cognition, which underlies the logic of classical and, even general and special theories.
Quantum mechanics unveils the internal world of substance that constitute the external physical reality. The principles of general and special relativity dispense with reality. Although, “General and special” theories are on the ‘cusp’ between the realm that quantum mechanics explicitly talk about, and with the ordinary physics classical mechanics outlines. In all these sciences however, what it means to be “physical” is identical with; what it means to be in motion, I.e, physics or physical.
Quantization
The idea of “physicality”, or what object is considered physical, relates to that object either being in motion, or exhibits motion as an internal principle. This means that even though an object is externally perceived as solid of static, meaning that it maintains an identity throughout the natural change in its environment, it still exhibits microscopic or internal entropy of motion, of energy coming “in”, and degenerating “out” of and into nothing. Einstein’s notion of light, for example, is an application of quantum mechanics because he discovered that light involves a quantization of ‘particles’ and NOT just waves.
These “quantizations” are the moment of transformation between a form into “quanta”. A ‘quanta’ is the result that develops by the process of quantization where the number set of possible values (quantity), are restricted to certain variables that can only assume discrete magnitudes (a system). A system is more than just a quantity because it exhibits varying degrees of possible values, i.e, of qualities that belong to degrees of quantities. For example, the physical quantity of light, what it ‘is’ as a quality for sensation, involves both these dynamical motions of point and wave, it is at one place at one time, and also it is at “all” places at the same time.
Light
Light is both the manifestation of points because it appears as discrete spheres of energy, called photons, and at the same time, light is also a wavelength of these discrete points into fluctuations (or exaggerations) of the particles’ magnitudes. We can say, the same entity is exaggerated microscopically, or macroscopically, while still exhibiting the same basic nature. This latter motion is further elaborated in the idea of quantum entanglement, where objects differentiated by vast areas of space, still exhibit a corresponding rotation.
The dichotomy between quantum science and the general and special ideas of physics is precisely the contradiction between the external and internal relations in ontology. For example, the physical sciences say that “matter” can never be ‘created nor destroyed’ but only altered. Yet this does NOT explain the presence of the infinitude of objects in the universe, or how they come to be because if we assume that there is an infinity of things. The latter assumption is the same as saying NOT everything is conceived, and if everything is NOT conceived, then something things ‘are’, while other things are NOT; so the question is why this dichotomy[?], why are some things true, while other things are not-being, if both of which, are constituted within the notion of infinity?
How do all such objects come to be? Physics assumes that movement and relations itself constitutes the form and objects for observation. When you observer a motion you at the same time observer an object. However, this does NOT explain the source of this motion forming the object. In quantum mechanics, the introduction of the observer into this dynamical motion captured as the abstraction of an object, provides a standard for being and non-being. If the observer becomes this standard of when something is conceived into being, and when it is NOT conceived and is therefore non-being, why do substances in the universe such as “light” or moreover fundamentally, energy, can never be “destroyed” or “created”. How does generation correspond to being, while destruction relates to non-being?
The answer might seem self-evident, however it is NOT clear because the destruction of one object is invariably intersected by the generation of another, so therefore it seems that there is always content in the universe, there is always “leftover” of energy, it never runs out. In conclusion, this energy is therefore properly associated with the observer as this indivisible aspect part of the conception of any physical process. The religions, and even older (ancient) philosophies even before the Greeks, associated light with the eternal, and the eternal is associated with God. In islam for example, God is specifically associated with an eternal light, the essence of light is a conscious observer.
The idea of God however cannot explain the generation of forms, but can only say that these forms are generated from some eternal being, but NOT only the forms, but the relations between forms after they are generated. For instance, physics can say that light is a particle as well as a wave, but physics on its own does NOT explain what property wave and particle belong to in order to produce the phenomenon of light because what light is in and of itself is identical with what it is as a function in relation to a complexity of other things, so that light can only be understood as a thing by the function it serves in relation to something else.
What motion is and how both concepts are found in something that contains them, yet physics, on its own, is unable to explain the kind of relation where light and motion produce to form different than both principle respectively (find whitehead about physics). It is one thing to explain that respective principle interact in the way it interacts in some other respective entity, but it is another thing to explain how the relation it has with other entities makes it itself an essential thing. What a thing is, as an essential thing, requires it to be part of a conception of mind, or rather, a property of reason.
Quantum intro cont. (quantum related to older metaphysics)
In fact, science needs to explain how principles interact to form a new entity before they can explain the nature of their interaction, in what “seems” to be a complete thing that is already given. For the latter is NOT the same as the former. For example space and time are principles operative in matter, is NOT the same to say, that space and time are principles that generate matter. The physicist has to ask – “if and how” – matter is produced from space and time and NOT only explain how space and time are logically deduced from matter. Now in both cases, matter, is already presupposed before the need to explain its generation and how principles interact in it.
This is due to the nature of inductive reasoning, which is what human cognition immediately begins with, that is, a multiplicity of particular principle(s) are derived from experience and, a general concept is produced thereafter that captures their nature, with the former is accepted by virtue of the nature of sensation. It is precisely the task of quantum science to answer question of generation. This is why the science is so difficult because NOT only must the science discover the principle that is responsible for the generation of things, but also what is the cause of such a principle itself? By “cause” we mean what it essentially belongs to. Since the time period of Bohr, there have been many attempts to develop the science of quantum but it has NOT really made any significant progress since its development. And the reason for this is because the science generally lacks an accurate ontology.
Kant- Two principles of quantum- matter is unit of activity, and perceiver and phenomena ( Kant- critique of pure reason)
Copenhagen principle- no event is actualized without perception of it- consciousness plays an essential role in phenomena- being.
The first principles of quantum that already has an ontological basis is the idea that matter at its very infinitesimal level involves an indivisible substance. That at the most minute state of matter, we reach a point of indivisibility, the atom. Where metaphysics supplements this claim is found in the understanding that the so called “indivisible” state of matter is something altogether different then the objects we see derived from the empirical senses. What is meant by indivisible is really what is understood as “activity” in metaphysics. Moreover the activity is that which serves as the foundation of the object, the object being its result or an abstraction of it. In quantum mechanics itself (in its modern use) the quanta is understood as a unit of process, a process that is itself a result.
The second principle of quantum is the idea that the perceiver and the phenomena are not separate but are both simultaneous, that is to say, the consciousness determines the phenomena. The ontological basis for this idea is found in the Ancient notion of the unmoved mover, or that substance is a cause that itself is not caused. This precisely explains that the nature of the activity is a nature that is a relation. Or that the relation is more fundamental than the parts.
When we say that the whole is prior to the part, the notion of whole is NOT defined as the sum of all parts. The whole in its definition means complete, for example, whole grain. When the whole is defined as complete it is impossible for it to be that which is the sum of all parts because by the very definition of part. A Thing that is a part, the collection of all parts together so long as the collection itself is the sum of all parts means that the sum itself is also a part. Even a sum can be a part because the defining feature of part is that which excludes something else as an other thing. By definition, the sum is a measure of some specific scale or size, that is distinguishable from that which lies outside the sum. If the part excludes nothing it cannot be called a part but a whole. The whole is not the sum of all parts but it is rather the expression of each part, this meaning shows that the whole is the nature giving each part its distinctive nature making it a thing different than another. It is in this way that the whole is fundamental to the parts, the whole is the activity giving each thing the kind of particular nature it has. And so the sum of parts are all expressions of the same whole, of the same activity, and the expression of a thing is complete because it is encompassment of it, it portrays what it is.
16:51:00, for Kant there is no “thing in itself” without experience means that there is no object independent of the substance, or being, but that being is at the same time object. This is explained with the notion that there is no “real” (having properties) thing outside the perception of it. Being partakes itself as object. This however does not mean that subsistence is simply the objects around us, a claim made by the scientific materialist. For Kant, the objects around us derive their nature because of the qualifications attributed by their conception from a consciousness.
On its own, it is easy to conflate this claim into the statement that objects are the product of the subjective consciousness directly perceiving it, and thus each object is never perceived the same from one subjective point of view in contrast to another, the vulgar idealism of Berkeley (check what he says that time and space are impossible). This makes science impossible for any principle science formulates means that it is an incomplete one and can be discredited by virtue of an opposing claim stating an otherwise proposition to it. Kant however does not take the conception of objects as only valid for the subjective that derived it, but rather takes the subjective conception of something as itself an objective reality. This The common question: if a tree falls without no one watching, does it fall? Kant says it will fall (find where he says) meaning that there is something will able for it to perceive it to fall.
(18:01:34) When Kant says that time is a condition of phenomena, he means that it is a determination of being. Time as condition is activity.
The contradiction that the universe is a finite quantity or an infinite quantity assumes that the universe is a thing in itself. If we take this assumption away and say that such qualifications are attributed to the universe, then the universe will not involve such a contradiction that it is either finite or infinite.
The “thing in itself” is the object and all the perceptions of it that capture its complete nature.
Aristotle’s notion of the unmoved mover has been one of the few unsolved philosophical notions. Moreover, this idea is so misunderstood and so misinterpreted that. The idea that there can be a substance which causes all others without itself being caused by anything else but itself, is one of the most perplexing ideas every proposed by human inquiry. This idea is not only abstract but duly empirical also.
The empirical criterion states that substance is more easily recognized through the conception of action rather than the permanence of the phenomena (Kant 9:43:10). If actions exist, it necessarily follows that substance also exists. (This has its roots in Aristotle) The conception of action explains the relation of the subject of causality to the effect, because all effects consist in that which happens, and in the changeable, the last substance is the substratum that is the permanence of all changes, even if the change itself is this permanence. The principle of causality states that action is always the first ground of all change and cannot be a property of a substance that itself changes because if this were the case, then other actions, and another subject, would be necessary to determine this change (9:49:53). Action alone as an empirical criterion is the sufficient proof of substantiality.
The idea is the principle of a change that is permanent. Change in its basic sense of the use is activity. If the conception of change is that which is permanent, then the permanent substance is that which is change. Change as permanence tells us nothing more than that the principle of causality is activity. But it does not state what effect the activity produces nor whether the change of the activity is that of development. The very notion of change presupposes that the same subject existing with two oppose determinations. (9:13:08).
What the permanence of the activity means as explanatory of the nature of the idea is precisely an explanation of the nature of objects. The multitude of objects each with a particular determination characterizes the nature of substance as the permanence of an activity. Each object belongs to a class of objects, a general nature. This general nature is the form, the activity and function of the particular object. What this means is that each particular object is an activity undergoing permanent change. This permanent change is not explained by a process where one thing becomes another, where he later excludes the former, or that the effect is something outside the character of the cause. (Explain how effect and cause are simontious Kant). It is rather from the very same substance takes on opposing determination, with each determination is an idea, an extension that takes on its own activity linked to the permanence of substance. And the change underlying each activity is that of development, but of a peculiar development, a respective progress pertaining to the own particularity of the form of the object. Yet this very particularity is only held by virtue that such an object belongs to a class of objects. This means that the permanence of the particular object is dependent on the general whole which it belongs to. We can say for example that one dog dies, but not the species of dogs, or even if the species dies, its genus remains and so on and so forth.
Cause and effect are simultaneous (Kant… critique of pure reason, 9:39)
When something happens, the mere fact of the occurrence without regards to that which occurs, itself, for Kant, requires investigation. (9:45:50). This is requisite to the understanding of change whereby one determination passes to an opposite determination. When a state A changes to another state B, if the state B differs from the state A, the change is a coming into existence of B-A. The change whereby one state A passes into another state B is understood thusly: between two moments there is always a certain time, and between two states existing in these moments there is always a difference having a certain quantity. (9:49:20). Every transition from one thing into another is always effected in a time contained between two moments of which the first determines the thing which leaves, and second determines the state in which the thing passes. Both moments then are limitations, or negations from a time of a change, from an intermediate state of which they belong to the total of the change. The cause does not produce the change all at once or at one moment. All change is therefore possible only through a continuous action of causality which insofar as it is uniform we call a determination (9:50:40).
Morphism
For Kant there is no smallest degree in this state of continuity. When A and B are taken together they are less than the difference of 0 and A.
The parts of the progression exists in time by means of the snythesis thereof, and are not given antecedently to it (9:53:00). What is meant by the notion that a thing can be a cause without itself causes (unmoved mover) means that the relation is more fundamental than the two parts, the transition into each other. When we say that one thing enters and the other passes, it is the same as saying the thing which enters is a passing and that which passes is an entering. For a thing entering is also at the same time a passing that is an entering, or whether a thing passes is at the same time an entering that is a passing. This means that from the perspective of the same substance, its entering denotes that it is passing, and its passing denotes from the negative that it is entering. When a thing enters this presupposes that its state of passing is an entering, inversely, when the thing passes, it presupposes its state of entering is a passing. This means that the action of change is a state where the opposite determination is the affirmative. Substance is therefore a morphism where the change of one state is a negation of the other state.
Kant rejects ever fully grasping this substance as a thing in itself. Substance for Kant is infinite and for that reason any conception of it is a limit to which substance is a transcendence beyond. Kant’s consciousness is the immediate one of the subjective which perceives the particular objects and represents them. The propriety consciousness that makes it infinite for Kant is impossible to attain. But for Hegel, the infinite is the very property of consciousness itself whereby be able to perceive the particular and finite.
Thought is the Nothing, the uncaused cause (connected to; two principles of quantum)
Hegel claims that at the very most fundamental level, this substance is understood as Nothing, which is a claim even more baffling than originally stated. How is the most fundamental substance, the uncaused cause, a contradiction by the very proposition of it, essentially, a Nothing? And how is it that this Nothing is everything, or rather, all Being? Hegel claims that the very claim of a nothing is in and of itself a something, but that makes the antecedent, the nothing, the very opposite to what it is, that is, a something. So in this sense, it ceases to be that which is Nothing and is now Something, a Being. But it as a Being makes it a caused substance, that which is a being by its very definition is a cause, and therefore the previous claim to an uncaused substance still persist independently, as Nothing.
From the face of it, these chain of assertions seem to be so abstract that they are devoid of any concrete meaning, or rather, they are devoid of any felt substance. But this claim is not only ignorant but also arrogant as well, for we have to asks: what is that which is able to produce such abstract assertions devoid of any matter? The obvious answer is that, reading, or the thinking faculty, produces such abstract question. So the question is: what is the thinking faculty? This general question is not meant to open an array of complex multiplicity of answers, it is rather looking for a very specific answer, that is, how is reason (the thinking faculty) able to produce a chain of infinite claims and ideas, while it that produces such claims, remains indifferent and analytical towards them? Empirical science answers that thinking does not produce its content but rather receives it as a blank slate facility, and what is received by thinking, namely it’s content and matter, is something on its own independently caused or that the cause is an issue unrelated to reason or logic, they pull the intellectual swift of hand and cleverly say that because there is randomness or chaos in the world and before reasoning of them, objects belong as part, and are caused, by chaos, they are random, having no reason to them. The materialist think that because object begin off as unrecognized, not received by reason, they are random, but this simple and crude observation is extrapolated into the ontological assumption that chaos is the cause of things and that reason comes as a result of that, which is an entirely illogical assumption because it does not explain how something rationally structured like an object, came together from an entirely unstructured and arbitrary source lacking any intention and any reason.
A so called epistemological question about the nature of thought follows crudely from the metaphysical question of the uncaused substance. So that reason is this substance, which remains Nothing, in the face of all things. One only has to literally reflect into their own thinking to see this claim at play. For example, right now you are reading this writing, but diverge your focus away, and a multiplications of differing ideas appear in your mind, all of which are grounded in an indifferent consciousness that is reflective of all of them simultaneously without direct conscious attention to each possibility. Thought invokes the following properties: a) consciousness that remains void of anything, not even a blank void like the pure colour black or white, but even Nothing in relation to that, and b) a consciousness that is that nothing as a something, now distinct as something other.
This Nothing by virtue of being this substance, is able to become Everything, while at the same time, remaining as that which is non of the things it became. Because the first substance is Nothing it cannot remain so because it already possesses this feature as what it is, therefore it becomes everything. (This relates to firstness, Secondness)
The quantum notion of Entanglement, or the theory of nonlocality is explained precisely by the claim that the contradiction in nature is itself concrete and that’s the resolution, and the form matter takes.
Pragmatic benefits of quantum ontology
The ontological investigation into the science of quantum prompts a pragmatic question: what benefit will an ontology of quantum bring to the realm of conduct. In other words, what will the scientist be able to do with an ontology of quantum? In the schema I hoped to show that knowledge is not only a theoretical system of representation but the process of thought itself is the process of changing material generation. If the scientist is able to capture the concept of an object, or that the idea is equally the conception of the object, then perhaps it is not to hopeful to assert that the next developmental state of quantum involves a self consciousness as the relation between the object and thought. That is, consciousness will not only know itself as consciousness but it will also be conscious of itself in the object of consciousness. The destiny of quantum science is the state of being whereby the mere thought brings with it the object of that thought. The future technology of quantum will enable the mind to produce its thought into objects by virtue of thought.
A gas is just a collection of atoms sharing the same activity. A collection of atoms consists of individual particles all sharing the same wave, that is to say, each particular atom is an expression of a general whole, and the general whole is the idea which characterizes the collection of atoms as a specific kind of nature.
Double split experiment
The double split experiment in quantum science has famously showed that the observer is intimately related with the phenomena. This is a pioneering empirical proof of something that empiricist would usually regard as wholly abstract, meaning that it is something theoretical, only is able of logical proof without having any material evidence. The double split experiment actually proves something more profound beyond its intentions. It proofs that logic, is not merely reducible to a theoretical system as the formal systems of logic argue.
The logic of quantum proved by the double experiment is as follows: if we take for example the basic conceptions of the point versus the plain, abstracted from each other, what do we have? With the point we already have a particular determination in the plain, and so the observer in this sense is faced with the law of non-contradiction- that something cannot be and not be at the same place at the same time. The phenomena in this sense determines the conception of the observer, but it does not determine it indefinitely.
If we have only the plain without the point, the observer has an infinite potential in determining the phenomena, that is, the observer is able to produce one point, two points, or an infinite number of points in the plain. In this sense the phenomena is determined, but not without the earlier qualification because what the observer is determining is the phenomena itself and so the determination is limited to the nature of what is being determined. The action of the determination is the limit for the determination itself.
The so called observer and the phenomena are fundamentally the action (process) of the determination and the result of the determination. For Aristotle, the process is not excluded by the result and the result is not something external from the process. The result is simply the nature that the process has brought and the process is the continuation of that nature in transition to another. From the observer, the same thing can be true and not true at the same time.
The observer is fundamentally the phenomena. This is explained in two ways: first, the observer is ordinarily translated as the consciousness of phenomena. Yet if by quantum standards, the phenomena is determined by the observer, or that the phenomena is fundamentally the observer, then the observer by the standards of quantum must be defined as self consciousness- or that the observer is defined as the consciousness of itself as phenomena.
Self-consciousness, a term that frightens the naturalist scientist, is fundamentally defined by the principle of identity, that something is equal with itself I=I (Hegel science of logic). The logical principle of identity simply states that any single thing is in fact a relation. The observer, being defined by the principle of identity, i.e. Self-consciousness, means that the observer is the relation in which the same thing may be true and not true, but only insofar as what it is true is and what is not true is able to be differentiated by the observer.
The observer and the phenomena are equivocal in that the observer determines itself as phenomena which serves as an identity of itself, an identity that becomes a fixity, a fixity that is a limit from which the next determination can be build on.