1.12 Object and thought

Section 9 (first update. 12.15.2020)

Higher Metaphysics

Modern science today presupposes that abstract “thinking” is subordinate and deficient in a fundamental way, because it requires proof. Something external to internal thought must be provided in order to fulfill the conditions of truth. Thought alone is not sufficient to classify something as true. In other words, every theoretical idea must also be materially verified; that is, the idea must be witnessed through sense perception in the physical world. According to this view, the truth of an idea depends on its correspondence to empirical reality.

In contrast, ancient metaphysics held a “higher conception” of truth. While material proof of a theory is advantageous for human understanding, it is also considered a limitation of truth in its most general and universal sense. The Ancients believed in “pure” truth—that is, truth uncontaminated by human bias or sensory interference. This truth was understood as a kind of substance whose defining feature was its non-physicality, yet which nonetheless exists and has effects on sensuous or felt reality.

The human way of apprehending the universe—through sense perception and logic—is not the universally complete form of truth. In fact, for the ancient Greeks, limiting “thought” to its physical manifestations, or to empirical observation, was considered a fundamental restriction on the nature of Truth itself. Yet paradoxically, it is only through this limitation that humans are able to grasp a notion of truth at all.

As Hegel writes:

“Ancient metaphysics had in this respect a higher conception of thinking than is current today. For it based itself on the fact that the knowledge of things obtained through thinking is alone what is really true in them, that is, things not in their immediacy but as first raised into the form of thought, as things thought. Thus this metaphysics believed that thinking (and its determinations) is not anything alien to the object, but rather is its essential nature, or that things and the thinking of them—our language too expresses their kinship—are explicitly in full agreement, thinking in its immanent determinations and the true nature of things forming one and the same content.”1

According to this conception, the true or complete way of the universe is actually a return to pure abstract substance. It is in this realm that things are considered into being. The object begins its existence in the purely abstract domain—it is first conceived—and only later becomes concrete or physical. In other words, the very idea of “physicality” is itself an abstract notion, a general universal concept encompassing all substances that affect or interact with one another.

The plan to cause those interactions, and the conceptual structure of the objects involved in those interconnections, exists first in a purely abstract realm. This means that their origin is not directly observable by a subject limited to sense-certainty. Thus, rather than being secondary or derivative, abstraction is primary—it is the ground from which the physical is derived.

Footnotes

G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopedia Logic, § 42. This passage articulates Hegel’s belief that ancient metaphysics correctly viewed thought as the essential nature of things, rather than as a secondary or alien element. ↩

Objects (may or may-not) exists

1.1 The Internal-External Relation — The Colour White as Example

Without thought, the object is both true and not true simultaneously.

On the one hand, thought identifies the object. Without this identification, the object may be said to both exist and not exist at the same time. Yet, it is also true that thought is based on the object, in the sense that the object is received as an externally given experience that stands on its own as something objectively real. However, the object is also based on the thought that receives it, because the object is conceived by thought. In this sense, the act of knowing is not simply a passive reception but an active constitution of the object.

Consider the example of the colour white. My opinion about white is limited by the observable fact that there is some phenomenon that appears white and not black, or vice versa. In other words, a distinction exists between two phenomena, each of which stands on its own as not being the other1.

However, my thought about the colour white and what the colour white is in itself bear no actual distinction. My thought of white is defined as a pale or colorless quality. A physically white object, by contrast, is defined in optics as one that reflects all wavelengths of visible light2. Nonetheless, my thought of white invariably involves an object that is white—milk is white, snow is white, etc. Even at the most abstract level, the thought of “white” is accompanied by the mental image of a plane or surface that appears white.

This unity between the thought of white and the object of white is not accidental—it is the very nature of thought itself. Thought does not simply refer to a general quality (e.g., whiteness) in isolation from the world, but always already presupposes a manifestation of that quality in some object. Thus, the internal-external relation is not oppositional but reciprocal: the object depends on thought for its conceptual being, while thought depends on the object for its sensory and empirical grounding3.

Footnotes

This mirrors Kant’s “transcendental idealism,” where the object is both given in intuition (empirically) and structured by concepts (a priori). See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A51/B75. ↩

This distinction echoes Hegel’s logic of determinate negation, in which something is defined precisely by what it is not. See G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic. ↩

In physics, a white object reflects most or all wavelengths in the visible spectrum. See “Color” in Encyclopedia Britannica, or any standard text on optics. ↩

Being – adjective

The very nature of the term Being presupposes its adjectival form—that it is becoming. When we use the term be-ing, what is implied is that it is continuing “to be,” not merely that it has at one point become. This ongoing nature of Being is not a pretence or a past condition, but rather implies that Being itself is a form of becoming.

Non-being is simply another way of describing becoming as well. That which is not Being is still in the process of becoming what it is not. In other words, something that exists outside of Being—or Being that is transitioning into nothing—is still in motion, still in transformation. Therefore, it too participates in the process of becoming. Becoming, then, is not only the process of emergence from nothing into something, but also a movement of Being toward its own absence, toward nothingness. In fact, in ordinary human experience, becoming is exemplified in the life-journey that inevitably culminates in death1.

Without thought, the object is both Being and non-Being. Thought allows the object to be determined as one thing rather than another. How it does so follows this principle: thought is substance, because it is inherently logical—that is, the very process of reasoning is what constitutes the most basic form of existence2.

Being and non-Being are not equal. However, they are equally unequal. They are not equal in the sense that Being is one thing and non-Being is another. Yet they are equally unequal in the sense that non-Being is what Being is not, and Being is what non-Being “is”. This implies a dialectical relationship:

  1. Non-Being is that which Being is not.
  2. Being is that which non-Being “is.”
  3. While non-Being remains what Being is not,
  4. This is the first moment of Being as other—that is,
  5. Some other Being is also Being, compared to not-being. But when comparing one Being to another Being, they are not-being each other (i.e., different), yet they are identical in the sense that both are Beings. And, importantly, neither is non-Being.

Being thus contemplates whether there is such a thing as non-Being at all, because everything it perceives is either itself, or some other of itself—which is simply another self. Whatever Beings exist, all are not-being each other. Non-Being is their shared characteristic: it is both the common difference that separates all Beings from one another, and the universal negation by which each Being is defined as not the other3.

Footnotes

This paradox reflects the dialectical logic where identity is constituted by difference. See Hegel’s notion of “determinate negation” (bestimmte Negation), whereby something is what it is by virtue of what it is not. ↩

This recalls Heidegger’s conception of being-toward-death, in which the finitude of Being is intrinsic to its temporal unfolding. See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Division II. ↩

Hegel claims that “pure thought” or the process of conceptual determination is substance itself. See G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, Preface. ↩

Thought has itself as Object

In many of his works—especially in Metaphysics—Aristotle frequently uses the term thought. His understanding of thought is broader than the modern conception. Today, we tend to reduce thought to the operations of the brain, viewing it as a function of the individual mind located in the physical organ.¹ However, for Aristotle, thought is not reducible to such individualistic or materialistic terms. Instead, he conceives of thought as a universal element in the cosmos—akin to air, fire, size, or density.² Yet unlike those elements, which can be transformed into one another, thought is, for Aristotle, the most fundamental substance. It is that which conceives all, but is not conceived by anything else in return.³ Thought has itself as its own object; it is a phenomenon to itself.⁴

Prime Mover

In his Metaphysics, Aristotle discusses the concept of the Prime Mover using the term thought throughout. In one idiomatic sense, thought is associated with the Ancient Greek term nous, often translated as “understanding” or “sense.”⁵ For instance, a person with nous is said to have common sense—they perceive what is happening and respond appropriately. However, in the Metaphysics, Aristotle uses the term more restrictively, yet in a sense more universal than this everyday meaning.⁶

Aristotle writes: “Human thought, or rather the thought of composite objects, exists within a certain period of time,” whereas “eternity is the thought which has itself for its object.”⁷ For Aristotle, thought is not the same as the individual understanding or perception found in human beings. He considers thought to be an element of the universe, much like the corporeal bodies of animals, plants, and the natural elements.⁸ But unlike these physical entities, which are “subject to increase and diminution,”⁹ thought is eternal and unchanging. He describes it as “a circular motion”—“which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality […] thought moves in this way.”¹⁰ What Aristotle means here is that thinking is the ultimate starting point of all things.¹¹

He argues:

“Those who suppose, as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus do, that supreme beauty and goodness are not present at the beginning—because the beginnings of plants and animals are causes, while beauty and completeness are found in their effects—are mistaken. For the seed comes from other individuals which are prior and complete. The first thing, therefore, is not the seed but the complete being. For example, we must say that before the seed there is a man—not the man produced from the seed, but another from whom the seed comes.”¹²

This is a very famous passage that discusses the old dilemma: which came first, the chicken or the egg? In other words, the question is about whether the whole precedes the parts, or whether the parts come together to make up the whole.

Man

Consider a concept like “man,” which is said to be a whole—one that consists of the cooperative effort of internally distinct relations. These relations function in such instantaneous and simultaneous harmony that they become indistinguishable, presenting a single, fully unified, acting whole.

If we represent this unified figure with an identity like “man”, then man is a full being—not only in the physical sense, where he is partial, but as a form, man is an eternal whole. As a whole, this form is part of a conception. The conception of things is prior to their partial material manifestation along the gradient of their total relations.

The Form of man is an eternal conception within spacetime. His finite character is in a constant state of flux, but as a form, you can remove its material configuration without affecting the presence or existence of the form itself. In this case, the form is the rational thinking mind—meaning that it is universal. Whenever a reality appears to exist, a rational mind exists as an observer within it; if it did not, no conception of reality could ever be discovered. Aristotle concludes, “We must say that before the seed there is a man—not the man produced from the seed, but another from whom the seed comes.”¹

Man, in his entirety—his complete nature and form—is prior to the physical manifestation of his material circumstances. The rational being is one of those developed forms that Aristotle refers to: forms that exist prior to any process. They are already complete from the beginning, not as the modern view suggests, where the process comes first and only tends toward completion at the end.

Rather, the ideal form is already present from the start. One might then ask: why does the process occur at all if the form is already complete? The answer could be that, because the form is ideal from the beginning, it continues to express its ideal nature throughout the process and into the future. If it truly is what it is, then it continues to be so—otherwise, it wouldn’t be itself.

This answer may seem unsatisfactory because it inverts our usual logic, but that inversion may be precisely the point.

Footnotes

  1. Aristotle’s view sharply contrasts with the modern neuroscientific approach, which generally localizes thought to brain processes.
  2. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book XII, 1071b. He frequently compares thought with elements or fundamental categories of being.
  3. Ibid., 1072a. Thought is described as unmoved, eternal, and fundamentally self-sufficient.
  4. Ibid., 1072b. “Thought thinking itself” (noesis noeseos) is Aristotle’s description of pure actuality.
  5. Aristotle often uses nous both in the sense of intellectual perception and divine intelligence. See De Anima, Book III.
  6. The general meaning of nous includes practical intelligence; in Metaphysics, it takes on an abstract, cosmic role.
  7. Metaphysics, 1072b. Aristotle contrasts temporal thinking with eternal, divine thinking.
  8. Ibid., 1071a–b. Aristotle includes biological and elemental bodies in his categorization of substances.
  9. Ibid., 1071b. All natural bodies are subject to generation and corruption, unlike the Prime Mover.
  10. Ibid., 1072a. The “circular motion” refers to the unceasing movement of the heavens, caused by thought.
  11. Ibid., 1072b. Thought is not a consequence but a primary cause—unmoved yet causing movement.
  12. Ibid., 1073a1. Aristotle refutes the view that goodness emerges only as an end result, rather than existing from the beginning.

Whole and Parts

Aristotle on the Priority of the Whole and the Nature of Thought

Aristotle here explains that the whole is fundamental to the parts, pointing out the complex relationship between the two. He writes:

“Evidently even of the things that are thought to be substances, most are only potentialities—e.g., the parts of animals (for none of them exists separately; and when they are separated, then they too exist, all of them, merely as matter), and earth and fire and air; for none of them is one, but they are like a heap before it is fused by heat and some one thing is made out of the bits. One might suppose especially that the parts of living things and the corresponding parts of the soul are both—i.e., exist both actually and potentially—because they have sources of movement in something in their joints; for which reason some animals live when divided. Yet all the parts must exist only potentially when they are one and continuous by nature—not by force or even by growing together, for such a phenomenon is an abnormality.”1

In this passage, Aristotle hints at a fundamental metaphysical paradox: there are parts within parts that are not considered substances, because some parts are merely powers or potencies contributing to the whole.2 The whole, however, is only complete because of its parts.3 Although each part may be considered a whole in its own right, insofar as it is an individual part, the parts are only truly parts when they belong to the whole.4

Thought as Its Object

Whereas self-consciousness conceives the object for its thought, universal consciousness—or the way reason operates in the world—conceives thought itself as its object.

Aristotle seeks the universal substance that gives each particular object its distinctive nature. The ancient Greek term for “particular” is kath’hekaston (καθ᾽ ἕκαστον) or kath’ekasta (καθ᾽ ἕκαστα), meaning an individual object or a definite nature.5 Indeed, to claim knowledge of an individual object is to point out its definite nature.

Aristotle argues that thought defines the nature of the object as something definite and particular. He describes the fundamental relationship between thought and its object in the following way:

“And thought thinks itself by dealing with that which is best in itself, and that which is thought in the fullest sense is that which is best in the fullest sense. Thought thinks itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought and object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought—that is, substance—is thought. And it is active when it possesses this object. Therefore, the latter rather than the former is the divine element which thought seems to contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best.”6

According to Aristotle, the object does not exist prior to the thought of it.7 Thought and object are indivisible in the world, because it is impossible for one to exist without the other.8 Thought and object thus constitute a synonymous relationship, though they require each other differently. If thought is removed and only the object remains, there is no indication as to why the object should exist. Without thought, the object may both exist and not exist at the same time, because there is no means of distinguishing one condition from the other.

Footnotes

For discussion on the unity of thought and object, see Metaphysics XII.9 and De Anima III. ↩

Metaphysics, Book Z (VII), 1035b24–1036a15. Translations may vary slightly depending on edition. ↩

This notion reflects Aristotle’s theory of potentiality (dynamis) and actuality (energeia), where parts may exist only potentially within a unified whole. ↩

See Metaphysics 1040b5–10, where Aristotle argues that form and the whole are prior in substance. ↩

Aristotle makes a similar argument in Parts of Animals, where he emphasizes that organs have function only in relation to the whole organism. ↩

See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.4, where he distinguishes between universal and particular (kath’hekaston) knowledge. ↩

Metaphysics XII (Lambda), 1072b18–30. Aristotle here describes the activity of nous (intellect) in its highest form. ↩

This is implied in De Anima III.4–5, where Aristotle describes the active intellect as that which brings thought into being. ↩

The word “abstract”

Aristotle’s notion of “thinking about thinking” suggests that thought desires its own activity as its object. In this self-reflective process, thought abstracts itself as an object external to itself and takes that abstraction to be the object of its desire.

The term abstract carries both negative and positive connotations:

(a) In the negative sense, abstract refers to something lacking concrete existence—a claim that cannot be empirically verified. However, this does not imply that something abstract does not exist; rather, the association of non-existence is tied to its unverifiability.¹

(b) In the positive sense, the abstract is a necessary precondition for anything to exist—it is the reason or principle why something exists. In this context, abstract as a noun refers to the idea or concept of something, the description that identifies the object. For example, the abstract of a book is a summary explaining what it is about. In architecture, a floor plan serves as an abstract representation of all the building’s components, such as rooms and their spatial relationships viewed from above. An architect must draft a blueprint before any physical construction can take place.²

Aristotle writes:

“But actuality is prior in a higher sense also; for eternal things are prior in substance to perishable things […] The reason is this. Every potentiality is at one and the same time a potentiality for the opposite; for, while that which is not capable of being present in a subject cannot be present, everything that is capable of being may possibly not be actual. That, then, which is capable of being may either be or not be; the same thing, then, is capable both of being and of not being.”³

Thought is actuality because, without it, “the same thing […] is capable both of being and of not being”—that is, the thing’s existence is indistinguishable from its non-existence; therefore, the object does not exist.⁴ Aristotle explains that thought is the actual substance because it is the activity that discerns whether the object is “of being or of not being.”⁵ Thought is essential because it identifies the object and thereby grants it meaning.⁶

The object, on the other hand, is the potentiality of thought, because it receives and embodies the meaning thought ascribes to it.⁷ Aristotle goes further and argues that if we remove all external objects and only thought remains, thought becomes receptive to nothing but itself as its own object.⁸ In the absence of all things, thought identifies itself.⁹

Footnotes

  1. This distinction aligns with epistemological skepticism, where lack of empirical verification does not equate to non-existence.
  2. This reflects the Aristotelian idea that form (or abstraction) precedes and informs matter.
  3. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Theta (Θ), 1049b5–10.
  4. Ibid.
  5. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1051a30–35.
  6. This corresponds to Aristotle’s view that actuality is prior to potentiality in terms of substance and knowledge.
  7. Ibid.
  8. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1074b34–1075a10.
  9. This is part of Aristotle’s concept of nous noesis noeseos—thought thinking itself.

Divine Thought

Aristotle says that “while thought is held to be the most divine of phenomena, the question what it must be in order to have that character involves difficulties.”¹⁰ Aristotle aims to clarify what he means by the statement that “thought is the object.” He asks the following question: Is thought merely the act of thinking?¹¹ Aristotle speculates that the act of thinking can pertain to the thought of one particular thing and not to anything else.¹² Therefore, thought cannot simply be the act of thinking, because once that act is made into the object of thought, it no longer remains the same.¹³ Moreover, thought is not merely the thinking of particular things rather than others.¹⁴ If thought thinks nothing, then it is nothing; while if its thinking depends on something else, then thought is not substance, but merely an attribute—and thus ceases to be anything beyond that capacity.¹⁵

Thought, Aristotle says, is not merely a particular action that signifies the capacity to identify specific objects. He writes:

“Thought in the fullest sense deals with that which is best in itself. And thought thinks itself because it is that which is best in the fullest sense.”¹⁶

Aristotle further explains the idea that “thought has itself for its object,” which means that substance “must be itself that which thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking.”¹⁷

This means that the object is always inherently a principle of thought, because thought is the element that identifies the object.¹⁸ The deeper claim is that thought does not merely identify the object, but that in identifying it, thought actually creates the object.¹⁹ Aristotle goes on to argue that the activity of thought characterizes the divine notion of “God.” He writes:

“If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better, this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God’s essential actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God.”²⁰

The ancient word for “God” is theos or theios, both of which are interchangeable with the word divine.²¹ Aristotle notes that the word divine indicates something beyond normal human capacities.²² He also critiques the traditional views of the gods, referring to them as objects of worship, prayer, and sacrifice.²³ Aristotle seeks to correct such anthropomorphic conceptions of the gods, arguing that God cannot possess human-like personalities.²⁴ Instead, Aristotle associates the divine being with a rational soul devoid of feelings; it is self-sufficient, permanent, and an essential feature of the universe.²⁵ God is eternally engaged in the activity of contemplation, and this is the source of divine “pleasure.”²⁶ God, Aristotle concludes, is pure activity—pure thought thinking itself.

God is, therefore, the ideal of thought insofar as the human being has the capacity for rational study. The activity of this rational capacity is the single activity that best fulfills the criteria for well-being—or as Aristotle calls it, eudaimonia.²⁷ Eudaimonia conveys a meaning beyond mere human pleasure or so-called “happiness.”²⁸ It is the complete state of being. It is complete because it is the most comprehensive; there is no further end for it to promote.²⁹ Aristotle makes a parallel claim in calling God self-sufficient and lacking nothing.³⁰ In this way, eudaimonia is the state of the divine, which encompasses all other ends that are pursued for their own sake. The “virtuous” person partakes in this divine state of being by engaging in “intelligence,” which deliberates and determines what is “right” to do.³¹ The result is that the virtuous person partakes in the divine nature of thought by choosing to pursue action for its own sake.³²

In the same way that sensible forms are objects within human thought, Aristotle argues that life, human beings, and the universe are, in fact, objects in the thought of God. What we perceive as external objects are really the ideas of divine thought. Aristotle does not elaborate further on this profound notion—either because this is where his work ends, or because fragments of his writings have been lost over time. Nevertheless, he does provide specific and detailed reflections on the nature of thought.

Footnotes

  1. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Lambda (Λ), 1072b18.
  2. Ibid., 1072b20.
  3. Ibid., 1072b23.
  4. Ibid.
  5. Ibid., 1072b24–25.
  6. Ibid.
  7. Ibid., 1072b26–30.
  8. Ibid.
  9. Ibid.
  10. Ibid., 1072b18.
  11. Ibid., 1072b20.
  12. Ibid., 1072b23.
  13. Ibid., 1072b24.
  14. Ibid., 1072b25.
  15. Ibid., 1072b26–28.
  16. Ibid., 1074b33–35.
  17. Ibid., 1074b34–1075a10.
  18. Ibid.
  19. This interpretation is consistent with Aristotle’s theory of actuality giving form to potentiality.
  20. Ibid., 1072b25–30.
  21. Greek lexicon entries: theos (θεός), theios (θεῖος).
  22. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1074b1–10.
  23. Ibid., and Nicomachean Ethics, Book X.
  24. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1074b15–20.
  25. Ibid.
  26. Ibid.
  27. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, 1177a10–25.
  28. Ibid.
  29. Ibid., 1177b20–30.
  30. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1072b26.
  31. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a15–20.
  32. Ibid., 1106a5–10.

Logos is Natural Formula

Reason as Substance: Aristotle’s Concept of Logos

The concept of “Reason” precisely explains what Aristotle means by thought as the substance in the universe. Aristotle states:

“For Reason is one, so that if matter also is one, that must have come to be in actuality what the matter was in potentiality. The causes and the principles, then, are three, two being the pair of contraries of which one is formula and form and the other is privation, and the third being the matter.”1

Here, reason denotes the intelligible characteristics that constitute the nature of thought. Aristotle employs the ancient Greek term logos to define reason. Aristotle begins by asserting that Reason (logos) is one—a singular, unified principle. Here, Reason refers not merely to discursive thinking but to the intelligible structure or form underlying all things. It is the universal principle by which things are known and by which they come to be what they are. This also hints at divine thought or pure actuality, which is unified and unchanging in contrast to the multiplicity of the material world. If matter were also unified and singular in the same way as reason, then we would see a perfect correspondence between the intelligible and the material. In other words, if matter (which is typically indeterminate and plural) were one and uniform, then it could perfectly reflect the unity of reason.

Logos indicates the activities and structures essential in all objects.2 When Aristotle says that an object possesses logos, he is referring to the formula (logos) of the object—what makes it what it is.3 The formula of the object, when analyzed in succession, allows for a true definition of the object’s essence.4 This is a restatement of one of Aristotle’s most fundamental principles: actuality is the realization of potentiality.
Matter, by itself, has no form or definition—it is potentiality. It needs form (provided by reason or logos) to become actual.
So, if both matter and reason are unified, then everything that exists in actuality must have arisen as the realization of what matter was potentially capable of becoming. This emphasizes the teleological nature of Aristotle’s metaphysics: everything exists for the sake of a form, and matter exists to fulfill that form.

Aristotle asserts that the formula of the object is logic, defining thought as “thinking on thinking.”5 This implies two essential things:

  1. Logic is the activity of thought that generates the form of the object.
  2. Logic is also the systematic reflection on the object of thought.

Thus, logic is both the natural formula of the object and its scientific definition.6

The ancient term logos defines reason. Logos is simultaneously the natural formula of a thing and its scientific explanation. It also denotes logic, as understood by the Ancient Greeks. For Aristotle, logic is not merely formal, but natural—it arises from the very structure of being and thought.7Aristotle now enumerates the three fundamental principles (or causes) of being:

  1. Form (or formula): The what-it-is of a thing, its essence or definition.
  2. Privation: The absence of a form, which allows change to occur.
  3. Matter: The underlying substrate that receives form.

This is part of his four-cause doctrine, although here he focuses on the intrinsic causes (material, formal, and privation as a sort of enabling opposite of form). The fourth cause—efficient cause (what brings a thing into being)—is sometimes implied or treated separately.

“…two being the pair of contraries of which one is formula and form and the other is privation…”

Aristotle sees form and privation as opposites. Form is the presence of a particular configuration or essence; privation is its absence. Change occurs when something moves from a state of privation (not having a certain form) to having that form.

For example, a block of marble is in a state of privation with respect to the statue it could become. When the sculptor shapes it, it moves toward form—realizing its potential.

“…and the third being the matter.”

Matter is what underlies both form and privation—it is the substrate that has the potential to receive either. Matter is not itself any particular thing; rather, it is the possibility of being something.

Footnotes

Metaphysics, Book XII, 1070a, Unlike later formalist logic, Aristotle’s logic is grounded in being—logos reflects the real structure of the world, not just abstract rules of inference. ↩

Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book XII (Lambda), 1070a. This passage describes how actuality arises from potentiality and identifies the three causes: form (or formula), privation, and matter. ↩

Logos encompasses structure, order, proportion, and intelligibility in a thing. It is what makes something intelligible to reason. ↩

Aristotle uses logos in both a metaphysical and epistemological sense: it is the internal principle of a thing and the rational explanation of that thing. ↩

See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, where he explores how definitions and essences are known through analysis of cause and form. ↩

Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book XII, 1072b. The phrase “thinking on thinking” (noēsis noēseōs) refers to the highest activity of divine reason and is often interpreted as the self-reflexive act of thought. ↩

Aristotle merges ontology and epistemology: what a thing is (its being) and how it is known (its definition) are both contained in its logos. ↩

Thought is (at the same time) an object

Thought as Object

Thought is, at the same time, the object of itself. For example, in order to move your hand, you must think about moving it. Whether this occurs consciously or unconsciously, you are thinking about your hand’s movement—its presence and motion. In this case, the existence of the hand is already presupposed. The question then arises: Why is the hand presupposed as existing in order to be moved?

The answer is that knowing the hand is there indicates that it is there. Without the knowledge of the hand, there is no certainty that the hand exists—or, indeed, that it does not exist. However, the hand also exists as an object independent of the knowing of it; you do not have to be constantly thinking about the hand for it to exist. Something exists on its own.1

Without thought, the object exists as much as it does not exist—and does not exist as much as it exists. That is to say, its existence is indistinguishable from its non-existence, and therefore it does not exist in any definite way. But with the presupposition of thought, the object always exists, because thought takes itself as the object before it can doubt it. And when thought doubts the existence of the object, that doubt is maintained by the privation of thought.2

The privation of the thought that the object might not exist makes the thought of its existence confirm its reality—even to the thought of its non-existence. The privation of thought is what Aristotle refers to as matter without form, or more precisely, a state of matter known as lack of form. In other words, privation is still a reality in the universe—a reality that lacks actual existence.

Thus, thought and the object of thought are literally the same. You, as a body, are simply the manifestation of thought; the body is the action or expression of thought.

Reason is the substance, not merely the principle, of development in the world.

Before proceeding to an explanation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, it is important to note that this inquiry offers a radically new perspective on Aristotle’s fundamental concepts—especially what he understands by the concept of reason (logos). It is essential, before moving into the subsequent chapters, to familiarize oneself with what is meant here by “reason” in the Aristotelian sense.

Footnotes

“Privation of thought” here refers to the absence or withdrawal of active thinking about the object, which paradoxically affirms the object’s existence through doubt. This resembles Descartes’ insight in Meditations, where doubt itself confirms the existence of the doubting subject. ↩

This distinction recalls the classical philosophical debate on idealism vs. realism, where idealism holds that objects depend on perception or thought for their existence, whereas realism asserts that objects exist independently of our awareness of them. ↩

Purity

Thought as the Principle of Purity

All this indicates that thought is the absolute principle of purity. Purity metaphorically characterizes thought because thought remains distinct from whatever it produces. The central question now becomes: How does thought, if it is pure substance, derive subjectivity as a particular act while still remaining itself? This is a prominent theme throughout the entire inquiry, because it is the question that seeks the essence of substance.

In other words: How and why is substance substantial? This appears as a kind of double negative, since the answer, while self-evidently true, is not immediately evident to reflective thinking. This is because purity is itself a definite act, and yet what it is—as a peculiar nature—is the substance that remains pure even in the presence of relational distinctions.

By definition, purity remains even pure from itself—that is, it does not become impure by becoming itself. Therefore, if purity is the substance capable of containing differences, it must necessarily remain pure from those very productions. Thought is the essence of purity, and every particular object is pure in being the kind of thing that it is.

For instance, gold is considered a pure element because it is unmixed. Similarly, air, water, and other elemental substances are pure material elements insofar as they exist as distinct types. Even when these elements combine, they retain their identity within relational contexts. These are examples that embody or “mix” the nature of thought within themselves—that is, they reflect thought’s principle of distinction within unity.1

The method of applying a definition of a term to itself arises from the logical necessity that terms possess distinctnessfrom one another. For this to occur, terms must presuppose their own meaning as true before they are applied in relation to other terms.2 This fundamental self-relation—the idea that anything must first relate to itself before it can relate to something else—is almost entirely overlooked by modern science, which tends to focus on external relations while neglecting internal identity.

This subtle but crucial shift—from the ability of thought to identify itself, to the act of actually identifying itself—is what constitutes the survival of thought as intentional. As long as thought holds conceptions of itself, it remains an object for its own thinking. In this way, thought achieves a self-sustaining intentionality.3

Immanuel Kant is the first in the modern era to presuppose the principles of nature—such as space and time—not merely as physical absolutes, but as abstract principles of mind.4 This does not mean that they do not exist, nor that they are mere conceptualizations; rather, the abstract is the model upon which the concrete is based. In other words, the abstract is not merely theoretical—instead, the theoretical is grounded in the abstract.5

Footnotes

This inversion of the abstract and the concrete parallels Hegel’s dialectics, where the abstract is not merely hypothetical but the foundation from which determinate being emerges. It also contrasts sharply with the empirical realism of post-Kantian science. ↩

Aristotle’s doctrine of substances (in Categories and Metaphysics) upholds that each natural kind has a unique form (essence) that determines its identity, even when involved in mixtures or relations. ↩

This reflects a logical and phenomenological principle found in thinkers like Hegel and Husserl: the idea that identity and meaning emerge from a reflexive relationship, where thought must first grasp itself before engaging external content. ↩

The concept of intentionality—that thought is always “about” something—originates in medieval philosophy and is revived in modern terms by Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl. Your point closely aligns with phenomenological self-awareness, where thought constitutes itself through reflective acts. ↩

See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant argues that space and time are a priori forms of intuition—structures of the mind that make experience possible. They are not derived from experience but are conditions for experience. ↩

Logic is the Activity of Thought

The Nature of Thought and Logic in Aristotle

Thus far, it is clear that for Aristotle, form is the defining nature of matter, and form is inherently an activity. Moreover, form and matter are two necessary components of the same unified reality—namely, reason. This leads us to the final and most essential question:
What is the nature of reason that causes matter to take on form?

Aristotle is deeply interested in logic, not only because logic determines the correct method of reasoning, but because he believes logic is the object of thought that generates the form essential for matter. For Aristotle, logic is the activity of reason that makes thought the substance of the world. Logic, then, is not merely a human product but belongs organically to the structure of reality itself. Logic constitutes the form of thought, made up of infinite relations that express every possible determination. As we will see, the relations of logic take on structure in the material substratum.

According to C. S. Peirce, “an idea without efficiency is impossible.”[^96] Similarly, for Aristotle, thought must be an object, otherwise it would not be an activity. That is, thought must result in itself in order to persist as a process. Aristotle explains that thought and the object are identical:

“And thought, in thinking itself, deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thought in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense. And thought thinks itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought and object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e., substance, is thought. And it is active when it possesses this object.”[^98]

According to Aristotle, the object does not exist prior to the thought of it. Thought and the object are indivisible in the world because one cannot exist without the other. If thought is removed and only the object remains, there is no justification for why the object should exist at all. Without thought, an object might both exist and not exist simultaneously, because there would be no means of determining its existence over its nonexistence.

Conversely, if we remove all objects and only thought remains, thought becomes receptive only to itself as its object. For Aristotle, thought is the substance that takes its own self as the object of thinking.

It is important to recognize that thought is not reducible to an action. The act of thinking is merely the efficient cause of thought, not its essential determination. Aristotle asks: Is thought merely the act of thinking? The act of thinking can be directed at one object but not at another. Therefore, thought cannot be equated with the act of thinking, because once the act is thought of, it ceases to be the same. Moreover, thought does not selectively think about some things and not others. If thought thinks of nothing, then it is nothing. And if its activity depends entirely on something else, then thought is not substance, but merely a capacity, and ceases to be anything beyond that.

Aristotle asserts his primary metaphysical proposition: substance is “thinking [about] thinking.”[^98] To this day, this remains one of the most debated and enigmatic claims in all of philosophy. However, for Aristotle, this is not an empty tautology. Thinking about thinking defines the very nature of logic as the activity of substance. Logic, for Aristotle, is infinite, but that infinity itself takes on particular form. The particular form of logic is a finite abstraction from reason, which remains infinitely determinate in nature. This is what Aristotle means by the object of thought.

Next, we must understand how logic constitutes the infinite nature of thought.

Selected Citations & References

  • Aristotle. Metaphysics VII.1.1028a10–30. Tr. Jowett, rev. Barnes. [^95]
  • Hegel. The Science of Logic, 42. [^96][^97]
  • Aristotle. Metaphysics XII.7.1072b1. Tr. Jowett, rev. Barnes. [^98]
  • Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, Glossary p. 429. Tr. Irwin. [^99][^100]
  • Aristotle. Metaphysics XII.9.1075a5. Tr. Jowett, rev. Barnes. [^101]
  • Aristotle. On the Heavens I.3.270a30–b30. Tr. Jowett, rev. Barnes. [^102][^103]
  • Aristotle. Metaphysics XII.7.1072a25–b30. Tr. Jowett, rev. Barnes. [^104]–[^106]
  • Aristotle. Metaphysics VII.16.1040b5–15. Tr. Jowett, rev. Barnes. [^107]–[^110]
  • Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, Glossary pp. 418–407. Tr. Irwin. [^111]–[^142]
  • Aristotle. Metaphysics XII.2.1069b30. Tr. Jowett, rev. Barnes. [^143]
  • Aristotle. Metaphysics XI.1049b15–25. Tr. Jowett, rev. Barnes. [^144]
  • Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, Glossary pp. 422–423. Tr. Irwin. [^145][^146]
  • Aristotle. Metaphysics XII.9.1074b30–35. Tr. Jowett, rev. Barnes. [^147][^148]

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